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ExEcutivE summary 
1.	 Gas	production	in	Russia	has	been	stagnating	in	recent	years	because	
of	 a	 significant	 decline	 in	Gazprom’s	 output.	The	 share	 of	 Russia’s	
largest	gas	company	relative	 to	 total	domestic	production	has	also	
been	shrinking	systematically.	The	main	causes	of	the	weakening	of	
Gazprom’s	position	in	Russia’s	gas	market	concern,	on	the	one	hand,	the	
unfavourable	situation	in	external	markets	(especially	the	decline	in	
the	volume	of	gas	supplies	to	Ukraine),	and	on	the	other,	declining	gas	
consumption	in	Russia	itself	and	rising	competition	from	Russia’s	so-
called	independent	gas	producers	(Rosneft,	Novatek).	The	fiscal	policy	
towards	the	gas	sector	has	also	exacerbated	these	negative	trends.	
2.	 Despite	the	Russian	government’s	optimistic	expectations	and	the	am-
bitious	plans	of	Russia’s	gas	companies,	the	outlook	for	gas	production	
growth	in	Russia	is	pessimistic.	While	the	gas	companies	do	have	an	
adequate	resource	base	enabling	them	to	increase	production	in	the	
short	term,	the	demand	for	gas	in	Russia	and	in	external	markets	is	
unlikely	to	increase	over	the	medium	and	long	term.	Moreover,	in	the	
longer-term	perspective,	delays	in	the	development	of	new	fields	may	
generate	problems	and	become	a	major	barrier	holding	back	the	growth	
of	domestic	gas	production.	
3.	 Although	Russia’s	internal	gas	transmission	network	underwent	ex-
pansion	during	the	years	2000–2016,	boosting	the	levels	of	access	to	gas	
networks	throughout	the	country,	its	current	state	is	still	well	below	
what	Russia	expected	to	achieve.	Moreover,	the	existing	transmission	
infrastructure	is	largely	obsolete	and	requires	much	more	substantial	
investment	than	what	Gazprom	has	so	far	allocated	to	it.	
4.	 Russia	has	only	partly	achieved	the	strategic	objectives	of	its	gas	export	
policy.	It	has	managed	to	diversify	gas	export	routes	to	Europe	by	build-
ing	the	Yamal-Europe	and	Nord	Stream	gas	pipelines.	At	the	same	time,	
however,	its	tendency	to	use	gas	supplies	as	a	foreign	policy	instrument,	of	
which	the	developments	concerning	Ukraine	(2005/2006,	2008/2009	and	
2014-2016)	are	the	most	glaring	example,	has	led	to	adverse	political	im-
plications	for	Russia	and	negative	economic	consequences	for	Gazprom	
and	the	entire	sector.	Despite	its	efforts,	Russia	has	not	managed	to	sig-
nificantly	diversify	its	export	markets,	since	a	binding	legal	base	for	joint	
Russian-Chinese	gas	projects	was	only	established	in	2014–2015.	
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5.	 In	view	of	the	current	trends	in	external	markets	as	far	as	demand	for	
gas	is	concerned,	i.e.	declining	gas	consumption	and	lack	of	prospects	
for	a	marked	growth	in	Europe,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	projections	of	
gas	consumption	in	Asia	have	been	revised	downwards	several	times,	
it	does	not	seem	realistic	for	Russia	to	substantially	increase	its	gas	
exports	in	the	short	and	medium	term.	It	is	highly	likely	that,	in	the	
next	five	years,	Russia	will	manage	to	maintain	its	current	share	of	the	
European	market	(around	30%),	owing	to	the	existence	of	many	long-
term	contracts,	the	fact	that	Russian	gas	is	still	relatively	competitive	
price-wise,	Russia’s	increasingly	flexible	trade	policies,	as	well	as	the	
still	rather	pedestrian	progress	of	Europe’s	efforts	to	diversify	its	gas	
supplies.	In	the	medium	and	long	term,	however,	the	expected	increase	
in	the	supply	of	LNG	may	pose	a	serious	challenge	to	Russia	by	con-
siderably	boosting	competition	among	global	gas	exporters.	Genuine	
diversification	of	Russia’s	export	markets,	i.e.	access	to	the	Chinese	
market	via	pipelines,	is	a	matter	for	the	more	distant	future,	and	the	
expected	volume	of	exports	to	China	(38	billion	m3	a	year	under	the	
contract	concluded	in	2014)	will	not	make	China	a	viable	alternative	to	
the	European	market,	which	remains	of	primary	strategic	importance	
for	Russia.
6.	 The	strategy	to	develop	the	liquefied	gas	sector	has	so	far	been	unim-
pressive,	partly	due	to	inaction	and	lack	of	political	will	on	the	part	of	
the	Russian	government	and	energy	companies	(especially	Gazprom),	
but	also,	to	a	certain	degree,	because	of	the	dynamic	changes	in	exter-
nal	energy	markets,	especially	the	rising	competition	and	oversupply,	
as	a	result	of	which	prices	have	been	falling	and	the	future	profitability	
of	Russia’s	expensive	LNG	projects	has	dwindled.	Finally,	the	financial	
problems	experienced	by	Russian	companies	have	also	contributed	to	
the	delays.	
7.	 Despite	many	previous	announcements	and	discussions	within	the	sec-
tor,	Russia	has	not	managed	to	comprehensively	and	systemically	re-
form	its	gas	sector	yet.	The	most	problematic	issues	concern	price	liber-
alisation,	transmission	tariff	setting,	the	gas	sector’s	taxation	system,	as	
well	as	the	restructuring	of	Gazprom	and	a	further	curbing	of	its	export	
monopoly,	as	demanded	by	the	advocates	of	change.	As	the	so-called	in-
dependent	gas	producers	grew	stronger	in	recent	years,	the	likelihood	
of	 the	Russian	gas	 sector	undergoing	serious	reforms	has	 increased	
(the	opening	of	the	possibility	for	the	independents	to	export	LNG	is	an	
7O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
3/
20
17
indication	of	that).	Nevertheless,	Russia’s	deteriorating	economic	situa-
tion,	uncertainty	in	the	energy	markets,	the	complex	nexus	of	problems	
which	need	to	be	resolved	in	a	comprehensive	manner,	combined	with	
president	Putin’s	reluctance	to	take	risky	political	decisions,	will	all	
postpone	the	prospect	of	reforms	by	at	least	5	to	10	years.	
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introduction
For Russia’s finances, the gas sector is less important than the oil industry: while 
taxes on oil extraction generated a revenue of nearly RUB 4 trillion in 2014, gas 
taxes accounted for a mere RUB 0.4 trillion.1 However, the gas sector plays an 
important role in other spheres of the economy, mainly because Gazprom serves 
as an instrument for the attainment of Russia’s internal social and economic 
policy objectives, and because gas accounts for more than 50% of Russia’s pri-
mary energy consumption, with electricity generation accounting for 48% of 
total gas consumption, followed by industry (12%), households (11%), transport 
(7%) and other sectors (22%).2
The state-controlled Gazprom is nonetheless one of Russia’s biggest tax pay-
ers, contributing RUB 805.1 billion to the state budget in 2015 (for comparison, 
the top contributor Rosneft paid RUB 1.12 trillion in the same period).3 Rosneft 
accounted for 50% of all the taxes paid by state-controlled companies in 2015, 
while Gazprom’s share was 35%. 
The significance of gas exports as a source of budget revenue has nonetheless 
been systematically dwindling. This is partly due to the decreasing volume of 
exports (mainly to post-Soviet states other than the Baltic states) but, more im-
portantly, to the drastic slump in prices related to the decline in global oil prices. 
In 2014, the average price of Russian gas sold to European customers stood at 
US$ 345 USD per 1000 m3, yet by 2015 it had dropped to US$ 243.3 per 1000 m3 
and in 2016 declined further to a mere US$ 167 per 1000 m3. As a result, the value 
of Russia’s gas exports, which had reached a record level of US$ 69.1 billion in 
2008, fell to around US$ 31.3 billion in 2016.4
Gazprom remains the largest producer and supplier of gas to the internal market, 
and as such it is an important instrument through which the state indirectly 
subsidises domestic industrial production. In particular, this refers to such cru-
cial sectors as steel production, the arms industry, agriculture or the electricity 
1 ФНБ на всех не хватит, https://www.gazeta.ru/business/2014/10/22/6271465.shtml 
2 Figures of: http://ac.gov.ru/files/publication/a/9162.pdf 
3 «Новая модель развития» России зависит от нефтегазового сектора, https://cont.ws/
post/437729; «Роснефть» в 2015 году заплатила налогов на 1,12 трлн рублей, https://
rns.online/energy/Rosneft-v-2015-godu-zaplatila-nalogov-na-112-trln-rublei-2016-06-30/ 
4 Figures of the Central Bank of Russia: http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/?Prtid=svs&ch=Par_27
472#CheckedItem 
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sector. The availability of low-cost gas gives Russian products a significant com-
petitive advantage, which is particularly apparent in the steel sector. 
The state also uses Gazprom to supply gas to those regions of Russia which would 
generate losses for suppliers if guided strictly by economic calculation. For ex-
ample, the company supplies gas to the Arkhangelsk, Yaroslav, Tver or North 
Caucasus Oblasts, which are among the company’s biggest debtors.5 Moreover, 
the state also taps into the revenues generated by Gazprom to finance its costly 
undertakings, such as the organisation of the Winter Olympics in Sochi or the 
2018 FIFA World Cup. 
The company’s activities are also an important source of profits for the political 
and business elite of Russia. Even though Gazprom’s revenues have been shrink-
ing in recent years, the remunerations of the management board members and 
directors have been systematically rising. In the first three quarters of 2016, 
the company’s revenues slumped by more than 30%, while the income of the 
management board members (including benefits and bonuses) increased by 
around 22%.6
Because of the changes taking place in external markets and inside Russia, the 
Russian gas sector has recently found itself at a crossroads. The factors adding 
to the uncertainty include the growing rivalry between Gazprom and the so-
called independent gas producers, the multiplicity of reform concepts for the 
sector, and the need to take into account the state’s economic as well as political 
interests. 
The purpose of this paper is to present the upstream condition of the Russian 
gas sector and its prospects. To a limited extent, the paper also discusses the 
wider context of the changes that occurred in the Russian gas sector in the years 
2000–2016. 
Part I analyses the condition of the upstream sector, including the changing 
balance of power between the actors involved and the factors which have con-
tributed to the current stagnation in gas production. Part II tentatively sum-
marises the outcomes of Russia’s export policy in the gas sector and looks at the 
5 Долги потребителей за газ выросли до 162 млрд рублей, http://izvestia.ru/news/ 601977-
#ixzz4KnJEnFt5
6 «Газпром» увеличил вознаграждение членам правления на 22%, http://www.vedo-
mosti.ru/business/articles/2016/11/15/664851-gazprom-uvelichil-voznagrazhdenie
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export destinations and volumes of gas exports and the implementation status 
of the projects undertaken to diversify gas exports (including both pipeline 
and LNG projects). Part III is devoted to the plans and prospects for the sector’s 
reform and looks at fiscal issues, price liberalisation and the plans to change 
Gazprom’s ownership structure and limit the export privileges of Russia’s larg-
est gas company. 
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i. thE upstrEam sEctor
According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy published in June 2016, 
Russia’s proven natural gas reserves of 32.3 trillion m3 are the world’s second 
largest (after Iran’s) and account for 17.3% of global reserves. Russia is also the 
world’s second largest gas producer after the United States, accounting for 16.1% 
of global production.7 
1. main gas production regions in russia
The main gas-producing region of Russia is invariably Western	Siberia, in 
particular the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (see map 1 for the location 
of fields), which accounted for around 79–83% of Russia’s total gas production 
through the years 2000–2016.8 The Western Siberian gas fields altogether ac-
count for around 90% of Russian gas production, with the Yamburg, Urengoy 
and Medvezhye fields accounting for around 3/4 of total production (see Ta-
ble 1 for a list of Russia’s most important gas fields). Other important Western 
Siberian fields include those located in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, 
the Komi Republic and the Arkhangelsk and Orenburg Oblasts. Gas is also pro-
duced in some southern regions including the Krasnodar Krai, The Stavropol 
Krai and the Saratov Oblast. 
Table 1. Russia’s largest gas fields 9
Field name
proven 
reserves
(billions m3) 
owned by start of the extraction
output (billions m3)
2013 2014 2015 2016
urengoy 5 333 Gazprom 1978 90.6 85.5 n/d n/d
Bovanenkovo 4 304 Gazprom 2012 22.8 42.8 61.9 67.4 9
shtokman 3 939 Gazprom - - - - -
7 http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-
energy.html 
8 Figures of ТЭК России – 2015, http://ac.gov.ru/files/publication/a/9162.pdf; n/d – no data.
9 Газпром в 2015 г. в 1,5 раза нарастил добычу на Бованенково, http://www.oilru.com/
news/506418/; «Газпром» запустил новый трубопровод Бованенково – Ухта – 2, http://
www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2017/01/19/673576-gazprom-bovanenkovo-uhta 
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Field name
proven 
reserves
(billions m3) 
owned by start of the extraction
output (billions m3)
2013 2014 2015 2016
yamburg 3 109 Gazprom 1986 75.3 62.8 n/d n/d
astrakhan 3 087 Gazprom 1987 11.7 11.1 n/d n/d
Zapolyarnoye 2 353 Gazprom 2001 117.5 97.9 78.8 76.3
Kovykta 1 563 Gazprom 2022 - - - -
Kharasavey 1 422 Gazprom 2019-2024 - - - -
Krusenshtern 1 349 Gazprom 2022-2025 
2027-2030
- - - -
Juzhno-
tambeyskoye  1 003 Gazprom
2024-2027
2029-2030
- - - -
yuzhno-
russkoye  862 Gazprom 2007 25.1 25 25 25.1
severo-
tambeyskoye  862 Gazprom
after 
2029-2030
- - - -
chayanda  708 Gazprom 2018 - - - -
orenburg 664 Gazprom 1971 16.9 16.3 n/d n/d
medvezhye  559 Gazprom 1972 12.2 10.4 n/d n/d
Author’s compilation based on figures of the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and figures publi-
shed by the Interfax, Argus and Neft Rossii (Нефть России) agencies. 
However,	most	of	the	Western	Siberian	fields	are	nearing	depletion. These 
are mostly fields where production has been going on since the 1970s and the 
1980s: the Yamburg field is currently more than 50% depleted, the Urengoy field 
is more than 60% depleted, and the Medvezhye field – more than 80% depleted. 
Field depletion has also been showing up in the output figures of Gazprom’s 
daughter companies. The largest slumps have been recorded by the companies 
operating in the Western Siberian fields of Zaplyarnoye, Urengoy and Yamburg.
Efforts have been made to develop new fields in the gas-rich regions in north-
ern Russia (the Yamal Peninsula and the Arctic shelf) and in eastern parts of 
the country (Eastern Siberia and the Far East). However, contrary to original 
plans, the dynamics of production growth in the new production regions is 
13
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
3/
20
17
Sh
to
km
an
Ya
m
al
 L
N
G
Sa
kh
al
in
 2
Vl
ad
iv
os
to
k 
LN
G
Kh
ab
ar
ov
sk
Ya
ku
ts
k
Irk
ut
sk
U
kh
ta
So
ch
i
To
rz
ho
k
Fa
r E
as
t L
N
G
Pe
ch
or
a 
LN
G
Ba
lti
c 
LN
G
POWE
R
OF SI
BERIA
 1
NS
1
NS
2
POW
ER
OF S
IBER
IA 2
Bo
va
ne
nk
ov
o
U
re
ng
oy
Za
po
lya
rn
oy
e
Yu
ru
bc
he
no
-
-T
ok
ho
m
sk
oy
e
Ko
vy
kt
aC
ha
ya
nd
a
Ju
zh
no
-T
am
be
ys
ko
ye
/
Ex
is
tin
g 
LN
G
 te
rm
in
al
s
LN
G
 te
rm
in
al
s 
un
de
r c
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
Su
sp
en
de
d 
pr
oj
ec
ts
Pr
oj
ec
ts
 u
nd
er
 c
on
si
de
ra
tio
n
Pl
an
ne
d 
op
er
at
io
ns
Fi
el
ds
 in
 o
pe
ra
tio
n
LE
G
EN
D
:
Ex
is
tin
g 
ga
s 
pi
pe
lin
es
Pr
oj
ec
te
d 
ga
s 
pi
pe
lin
es
G
as
 p
ip
el
in
es
 u
nd
er
 c
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
M
ap
. L
oc
at
io
n 
of
 g
as
 fi
el
ds
 a
nd
 tr
an
sm
is
si
on
 in
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 
So
ur
ce
: И
то
ги
 р
аб
от
ы
 М
ин
эн
ер
го
 Р
ос
си
и 
и 
ос
но
вн
ы
е р
ез
ул
ьт
ат
ы
 ф
ун
кц
ио
ни
ро
ва
ни
я 
ТЭ
К 
в 
20
15
 го
ду
, h
tt
p:
//
m
in
en
er
go
.g
ov
.r
u/
no
de
/4
91
3
14
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
3/
20
17
rather weak. In Bovanenkovo, one of Gazprom’s most promising fields located 
in the Yamal Peninsula,10 the output in 2013 was less than 30 billion m3 of gas, 
instead of the projected 46.3 billion. Although in 2015 production increased to 
61.9 billion m3, that was still below the target for that year (75 billion m3). In 
2016 output increased again to 67.4 billion m3, which nonetheless proves that the 
plans to increase the Bovanenkovo field’s output to 115 billion m3 of gas a year 
in 2017 are unrealistic.11
The situation is similar in the Far East and Eastern Siberia. Russia’s Energy 
Strategy, until 2030, predicted that in 2015, gas production in the region would 
reach 58 billion m3 in the optimistic scenario and 44 billion m3 in the pessimistic 
scenario. In reality, it was just slightly over 41 billion m3. 
2. main gas producers in russia
Currently there are around 260 gas-producing companies in Russia. The state-
owned Gazprom is still the biggest player in this group, which single-handedly 
accounts for around 63% of Russia’s total gas output (68.1% with controlled com-
panies and joint ventures). The private-owned Novatek is the second largest gas 
producer, accounting for 8% of Russia’s production (10.7% with its controlled 
companies and joint ventures). Other players in the sector include the large 
oil companies and especially Rosneft, which accounts for 7.2% of Russian pro-
duction (9.4% with its controlled companies and joint ventures) and smaller 
private companies. Table 2 presents a list of the most important gas-producing 
companies, and Table 3 presents a list of the most important joint ventures of 
Gazprom, Novatek and Rosneft. 
10 Gas production in the field officially started in October 2012; the preparatory works that 
had to be carried out to enable extraction cost around US$ 41 billion, making the field one of 
the top ten most expensive extractive projects in the world. Падение спроса на газ ставит 
планы освоения Ямала под вопрос, http://barentsobserver.com/ru/energiya/2013/05/
padenie-sprosa-stavit-plany-osvoeniya-yamala-pod-vopros-23-05 
11 The target production volume of the field is 140 billion m3 of gas a year. 
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Table 2. Gas production in Russia in 2000-2016 by company (billions of m3)
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Gazprom 523.2 515.5 519.9 540.2 542.8 547.1 550.3 550.14 550.9 462.3 509 510.1 478.5 476.4 432.2 408.6 405.7
Gazpromneft 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.1 1.8 2.2 4.3 4.9 9 10.9 12.7 13.4 14.2 15.6
Novatek 0 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 25.4 28.8 28.5 30.8 32.8 37.8 53.5 51.3 53.1 53.7 52 50.9
Rosneft 5.6 6.1 6.4 7 9.4 13 13.6 15.5 13 17.4 17.3 18.6 20.2 40.6 44 46.7 50.4
LUKOIL 3.6 3.7 4.1 4.8 5 5.8 14.1 13.7 14.2 14.8 17.4 17.9 18.1 19.5 19.8 19.7 17.6
Surgut­
neftegaz
11.1 11.1 13.3 13.9 14.3 14.4 14.6 14.1 14.1 14 14 13.2 12.4 12.2 9.5 9.6 9.8
Russneft 0 0 0 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.1 2 2 2.1 2.5
Slavneft 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.9 1 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
Tatneft 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1 1.03
Bashneft 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.98
TNK­BP 2.7 4.3 3.6 5 8 8.7 8.7 8.6 10.1 13.1 13.6 14.7 15.7 0 0 0 0
Others 36.2 38.6 45.9 46.8 51.2 23.4 20.5 16.42 26.1 33.6 47.2 45.9 59.8 64.8 77 92.6 95.7
Total 584.2 581.2 594.94620.33633.53 641 656.2 654.13 664.8 596.6 665.6 687.5 671.5 684 654.3 648.4 651.31
Author’s compilation based on figures published by the Argus agency. 
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Table 3. Private gas producers controlled by Gazprom, Novatek and Rosneft 1213141516
company name shareholders output in 2015 (billions m3)
Arktikgaz 12
Gazpromneft, 50%
Novatek, 50%
23.6
Nortgaz
Gazprom, 50%
Novatek, 50%
10.9
Purgaz
Rosneft, 49% 
Gazprom, 5113%
12.4 14
Sakhalin Energy Gazprom, 50% plus 1 share 17.3
Sibneftegaz Rosneft, 50% 11.8
Terneftegaz
Novatek, 51% 
Total 15, 49% 
2.4
Taymyrgaz Rosneft, 51% 16 2.2
Tomskneft
Gazpromneft, 50%
Rosneft, 50%
2.1
 Author’s own compilation based on figures published by Interfax agency. 
12 The Arktikgaz consortium has total proven reserves of 695 billion m3 (as of 31 December 
2014). Its output has record growth dynamics: back in 2012 the consortium produced a mere 
1.78 billion m3 of gas, followed by 5 billion m3 in 2013, 7.78 billion m3 in 2014 and as much 
as 23.6 billion m3 in 2015 and around 26 billion m3 in 2016. Figures published by the Argus 
agency. 
13 Gazprom de facto controls the company: even though its daughter company Gazprom 
Noyabrsk formally holds 49% of shares in the consortium, Gazprombank holds another 1.7% 
of shares. Gazprom decided to transfer the 1.7% stake to Gazprombank to avoid having to 
pay higher NDPI tax (extraction tax). Not formally controlled by Gazprom, the Purgaz joint 
venture is treated as a so-called independent gas producer, i.e. paid lower extraction tax. 
However, after the Federal Tax Service, supported by the Investigative Committee of Rus-
sia initiated an enquiry and accused Purgaz of trying to circumvent the law, the company 
had to pay outstanding tax for the years 2013–2015 (around RUB 13.5 billion). Налоговый 
маневр «Пургаза» стоил уголовного дела для гендиректора и 13 млрд рублей выплат 
в ФНС, https://newdaynews.ru/yamal_ugra/562294.html 
14 The figures come from statistics published by the consortium shareholders, "Пургаз" 
отдаст ФНС всю выручку за год, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2939944 
15 As a shareholder in Novatek, Total is the largest foreign investor in Russia’s energy sector. 
16 Rosneft purchased the shares in the joint venture in 2014; the Federal Anti-Monopoly Ser-
vice authorised the transaction on 6 October 2014. ФАС разрешила "Роснефти" купить 
51% "Таймыргаза", http://www.interfax.ru/business/400454 
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Significant volumes of gas are also produced by undertakings established under pro-
duction	sharing	agreements. Currently there are three such projects in Russia. 
The	largest	one is the Sakhalin	2	project operated by the Sakhalin Energy 
consortium (the year 2014 marked the twentieth anniversary of the project). Its 
members include Gazprom (50% plus 1 share), the British-Dutch Shell (27.5% mi-
nus 1 share) and Japan’s Mitsui (12.5% of shares) and Mitsubishi (10% of shares). 
Sakhalin Energy’s output was 27.8 billion m3 in 2013 and 17.4 billion m3 in 2016.
The	second	largest	production-sharing	project	is Sakhalin	1 operated by 
Exxon Mobil (30% of shares in the consortium). Apart from the US operator, 
the consortium includes Rosneft (20%), India’s ONGC (20%) and Japan’s SODECO 
(30%). Sakhalin 1 has been struggling to increase its output due to problems 
with access to the transmission infrastructure. The consortium is considering 
building an LNG plant. In 2013 the project’s output was 9.96 billion m3 of gas 
and in 2016 – 9 billion m3.
The	third	production	sharing	project is Kharyaga in the Yamalo-Nenets Autono-
mous Okrug. The partners include France’s Total (40% of shares)17, Norway’s Statoil 
(30% of shares) and Russian companies Zarubezhneft (20% of shares) and Nenets 
Oil (10% of shares). However, the project’s output is not large – in 2013 Kharyaga 
produced 207 million m3 of gas and in 2016 only around 100 million m3.18 
The	production	of	so-called	associated	gas,	a	by-product	of	oil	extraction,	
has	been	growing	systematically	in	Russia,	even	though	the	growth	dy-
namics	have	been	weak	for	the	time	being. According to the Russian Min-
istry of Energy, around 42.6 billion m3 of associated gas was produced in 2005, 
and over 82 billion m3 in 2016. Rosneft remains the leader in the production of 
associated gas (35.6 billion m3 in 2016), followed by LUKOIL (11.1 billion m3 in 
2016), Surgutneftegaz (9.5 billion m3 in 2016) and Gazpromneft (8.2 billion m3 in 
2016).19 The increase of associated gas output is a direct consequence of official 
policy requiring oil companies to systematically increase the level of associated 
17 Total signed the deal in 1999 for 29 years. In 2016, the company decided to sell half of its 
shares in the project to Zarubezhneft, as a result of which the stake of the latter increased 
to 40%. After the transaction was finalised, Zarubezhneft also took over as the project 
operator. Source: «Зарубежнефть» получила Харьягу, http://www.kommersant.ru/
Doc/3053025 
18 Figures published by the Neftegazovaya Vertikal (Нефтегазовая Вертикаль). 
19 Добыча природного и попутного нефтяного газа, http://minenergo.gov.ru/node/1215; 
figures by FSUE Argus.
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gas utilisation; the 2020 target is to utilise 95% of associated gas (in 2016, 90% 
was utilised20). 
The problem is that this segment of the gas sector is highly unprofitable. With 
strictly regulated gas prices, utilising associated gas is costly. The downside to 
this is that Russia remains the infamous leader world leader in burning off as-
sociated gas. According to some reports, it wastes around 50 billion m3 of gas 
a year in this manner. 
3. stagnation in the upstream sector
The	Russian	gas	upstream	sector	has	been	stagnating	for	the	last	several	
years. While back in the years 2000–2008 Russia’s gas output grew system-
atically, increasing from 584.2 billion m3 in 2000 to 664.8 billion m3 in 2008, 
during the years 2009–2016 gas production remained relatively stable within 
the range of 640–670 billion m3 a year (the one exception concerned the deep 
slump in 2009, which was mainly due to the economic slowdown caused by the 
international financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009). For detailed figures 
on the production of gas in Russia in the years 2000–2016, see Table 4. 
In 2015 gas production decreased to 648.3 billion m3, the lowest level since 2010. 
It was lower than predicted in the Russian Federation’s Energy Strategy until 
2030 and much lower than in the General Scheme of Gas Industry Development 
until 2030 (predictions formulated for the purposes of the most important strat-
egy documents for the gas sector are presented in Table 5). It is worth noting that 
the actual production levels were also lower than the predictions formulated by 
the International Energy Agency in its World Energy Outlook. 
The	decline	of	gas	production	in	Russia	is	mainly	due	to	the	considerable	
decrease	in	Gazprom’s	output, which reflects a consistent tendency observed 
throughout the last decade. 
In the years 2005–2016 Gazprom’s output declined by more than 25% (from 
around 547 billion m3 in 2005 to 408.6 billion m3 in 2015 and 405.7 billion m3 in 
2016). Gazprom’s performance in the last decade was much lower than the com-
pany’s own projections made in 2008. At that time, the company predicted that 
in 2015 its own gas production would be in the range of 620–640 billion m3 a year; 
20 Нефтекомпании РФ в 2016 г повысили уровень утилизации ПНГ до 90%, http://1prime.
ru/energy/20161227/826988596.html 
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but the actual levels are lower even than the projections revised in 2009 (which 
predicted output in the range of 549–553 billion m3 of gas a year in 2015). 
Gazprom has been making such downward revisions to its projections ever 
more frequently, with every successive release giving rise to more doubts as to 
the real output prospects. In 2012 the company maintained that it was ready to 
increase gas production to 670 billion m3, in 2013 it expected to produce 620 bil-
lion m3, in the autumn of 2014 the figure was 550–560 billion m3, and in Febru-
ary 2015 – only 490–555 billion m3.21 
A	more	long-term	tendency,	visible	since	the	early	2000s,	concerns	the	
gradual	shrinking	of	Gazprom’s	share	in	Russia’s	total	gas	production. 
Back in 2003, Gazprom accounted for nearly 87.1% of total output, but by 2016 its 
share had decreased to 62.2% (see Table 4). In recent years, the company’s posi-
tion was strengthened slightly because of growing gas production in fields con-
trolled by Gazprom’s daughter companies and joint ventures. However, includ-
ing their output does not significantly alter the overall trends, which remain 
unfavourable to Gazprom. 
Table 4. Gazprom’s share in gas production in Russia in the 
years 2000–2016 (billions m3)
output Gazprom russia total Gazprom share (%)
2000 523.2 584.2 89.5
2001 515.5 581.2 88.7
2002 519.9 594.9 87.4
2003 540.2 620.3 87.1
2004 542.8 633.5 85.7
2005 547.1 641 85.3
2006 550.3 656.2 83.9
2007 550.14 654.13 84.1
21 «Газпром» понизил ориентир добычи газа к 2020 году, https://lenta.ru/news/2015/02/13/
gazprom/. In presentations delivered in February 2015 during the Investors Days in Hong 
Kong and Singapore, Gazprom representatives announced that in 2020, the company’s output 
would be in the range of 476–531 billion m3, including around 390 billion m3 in the Nadym-
Pur-Taz region (Western Siberia), between 60 and 115 billion m3 in the Yamal Peninsula, and 
around 10 billion m3 in Eastern Siberia and the Far East. Output in 2030 was to be in the range 
of 580–620 billion m3, including around 210 billion m3 in the Nadym-Pur-Taz region, between 
250 and 290 billion m3 in the Yamal Peninsula, and around 60 billion m3 in Eastern Siberia and 
the Far East. Source: Uncertain outlook for gas output, Argus FSUE, 12.02.2015, p. 6. 
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output Gazprom russia total Gazprom share (%)
2008 550.9 664.8 82.9
2009 462.3 596.6 77.5
2010 509 665.6 76.5
2011 510.1 687.5 74.2
2012 478.5 671.5 71.2
2013 476.4 684 69.6
2014 432.2 654.3 66
2015 408.6 648.4 63
2016 405.7 651.3 62.2
Author’s own compilation based on figures published by FSU Argus.
4. Factors underlying the erosion of Gazprom’s position 
One of the main reasons why Gazprom’s output has been declining concerns the	
negative	demand	trends	in	the	company’s	important	external	markets	and	
the	changed	situation	in	the	domestic	market,	including declining gas con-
sumption in Russia, systematically falling investments in the upstream sector 
and rising competition from the so-called independent gas producers. 
4.1. Negative trends in export markets
The	main	reason	for	the	steep	decline	in	Gazprom’s	gas	production	concerns 
the	dwindling	volume	of	exports	to	European	markets	and	the	post-Soviet	
states	 (except	for	the	Baltic	states). In 2008, Gazprom supplied a total of 
around 278.9 billion m3  to external markets, in 2015 the volume was 233.4 bil-
lion m3, and in 2016 – 214.1 billion m3 (including supplies to the parts of Donbas 
occupied by pro-Russian separatists). 
The slump in exports is particularly visible in the post-Soviet markets. Back 
in 2006, Gazprom exported 96.1 billion m3 of gas to those countries (the record 
volume for the 2000–2016 period), but by 2016 its sales to the post-Soviet states 
had declined to around just 26 billion m3, mainly due to the dramatic slump in 
supplies to the Ukrainian market (from 59.2 billion m3 in 2006 to 7.8 billion m3 
of gas in 2015, and to a total discontinuation of Russian gas imports by Ukraine 
in 2016).22 
22 However, Gazprom consistently reports gas supplies to the areas occupied by pro-Russian sepa-
ratists of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics around 2.4 billion m3in 2016). 
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Russian	gas	exports	to	the EU	also declined noticeably in certain periods. In 
2008 Gazprom supplied around 159.2 billion m3 of gas to the European Union, 
but in the years 2009–2012 the volume of exports decreased to 130 billion m3. 
Afterwards, exports increased again to 157.5 billion m3 in 2015 and just below 
154 billion m3 in 2016 (see Part II for detailed figures and a wider analysis of 
Russia’s export strategy). 
4.2. Declining gas consumption in Russia and fiscal burdens
Another	important	factor	concerns	the	altered	situation	in	Russia’s	do-
mestic	gas	market, where most of the gas produced in Russia is sold. The largest 
gas consumers in Russia traditionally include the electricity generation sector 
(around 48%), industry (12%) and households (around 11%).23 
Firstly,	gas	consumption	has	been	slowly	decreasing	in	Russia,	falling from 
491.4 billion m3 in 2005 to 454.6 billion m3 in 2015.24 The decline was particular-
ly noticeable in Gazprom’s sales in the domestic market, which fell from 307 bil-
lion m3 in 2005 to 221.2 billion m3 in 2015.25
Gas consumption was lower than predicted in the key strategic documents for 
the gas sector. According to the General Scheme of Gas Industry Development 
until 2030, domestic gas consumption in 2015 was expected to be within the 
range of 465–485 billion m3.26 
The main cause of the decline in gas consumption concerns the economic slow-
down in Russia. The consumption levels projected in the General Scheme of Gas 
Industry Development until 2030 were based on the assumption that Russia’s 
economy would grow at an average rate of 6.9% over the years 2007–2010 and 
6.3% over the years 2010–2015. Meanwhile, real GDP growth in these two peri-
ods was much lower: 2.6% and 1.3%, respectively.27
Another	 important	 cause	 concerned	 systematically	 increasing	prices,	
both	for	industrial	consumers	and	households. Prices paid by industrial 
23 Figures: http://ac.gov.ru 
24 Figures of the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation. 
25 Figures of Gazprom. 
26 Генеральная схема развития газовой отрасли на период до 2030 года, Москва 2008, 
p. 2–4. 
27 Figures published by Rosstat. 
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consumers increased 3.6 times (in roubles) and 2.7 times (in US dollars) in the 
period between 2005 and 2014. Thus, gas became less competitive compared 
to other resource and, on the other hand, rising prices stimulated energy effi-
ciency improvements and made the so-called independent gas producers more 
interested in the domestic market.28 However, while the initial assumption was 
that the domestic market would become increasingly profitable (gas prices were 
expected to rise by 15–20% a year to reach a level comparable with export prices 
in 2014, and Gazprom was indeed gradually ceding ever more of its market share 
to the so-called independent producers), in reality those expectations never 
materialised. Moreover, the dynamics of gas consumption in Russia is expected 
to be weak in the foreseeable future, and consequently, gas producers will most 
probably start to lose interest in the domestic market and turn to foreign mar-
kets (for more information on the liberalisation of prices in Russia’s domestic 
gas market, see Part III). 
The	tax	regime	in	Russia	has	also	contributed	to	the	decline	in	gas	produc-
tion.	In particular, this concerns the high rates of the gas extraction tax (NDPI) 
and an unequal distribution of fiscal burdens among the different companies. 
In 2011, a single NDPI rate applied to Gazprom and the other actors in Russia’s 
gas market but, in the years that followed, the rates were raised in a differ-
entiated way that was preferential to the so-called independent gas produc-
ers. In 2012 Gazprom’s rate was RUB 509 per 1000 m3, and the rate applicable 
to the other gas extraction companies – RUB 251 per 1000 m3. In 2014 those 
rates increased to RUB 700 and RUB 471 per 1000 m3, respectively, in 2015 – to 
RUB 788 and RUB 552 per 1000 m3, and in 2016, Gazprom’s rate was increased 
to around RUB 1078 per 1000 m3, and a new increase of RUB 413 per 1000 m3 is 
expected in 2017.29 
Finally, the energy	efficiency improvement	in	Russia’s	industrial	sector	also 
contributed to the decline in gas consumption. Energy efficiency was growing 
at the fastest rate in the years 2000–2008 (by 5.8% a year on average30). 
28 Внутренний рынок газа: как выйти из бермудского треугольника?, Нефтегазовая 
Вертикаль, Issue 13–14, 2015, p. 68. 
29 Минфин переливает топливо, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3118953 
30 http://earchive.tpu.ru/bitstream/11683/32173/1/conference_tpu-2016-C11_V2_p989-992.
pdf 
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4.3. Growing competition from the so-called independent gas producers 
The	third	internal	factor	concerns	the	growing	competition	that	Gazprom	
has	been	facing	from	the	so-called	independent	gas	producers.	
Though the total volume of gas production in Russia remained relatively stable 
over the years 2005–2016 (with small increases in the years 2010–2013), this 
was due to increasing output from the so-called independent gas producers. In 
2005, their total output was 86,9 billion m3, and by 2016 it had tripled to around 
245 billion m3 of gas (corresponding to nearly 38% of Russia’s total gas produc-
tion). This growth was much higher than had been predicted in the energy 
sector’s planning documents. As recently as January 2013, the long-term gas 
output projections of the Russian Ministry of Economic Development predicted 
that even by 2030 the share of the so-called independent gas producers would 
amount to just 27.6%.31
The	main	actors	among	the	so-called	independent	gas	producers	include	
Novatek,	the largest private gas producer in Russia, and Rosneft, the largest 
state-owned oil company in Russia. 
Back in 2004,	Novatek produced a negligible volume of gas, but its output in-
creased to around 25.4 billion m3 of gas in 2005 and had more than doubled 
by 2015, reaching around 53.7 billion m3. Novatek’s main gas fields are in the 
Yamal Peninsula. 
Rosneft’s	output more than tripled during the last decade, increasing from 
13 billion m3 in 2005 to 46.7 billion m3 in 2015. While most of Novatek’s gas (84%) 
is extracted in dry form from gas deposits, the gas produced by Rosneft is mainly 
associated gas extracted as a by-product of oil extraction. This sort of gas ac-
counted for around 76% of Rosneft’s total output in 2015. 
Rosneft has increased its share of domestic gas production mainly through ac-
quisitions. In August 2012, the company acquired 51% of shares in a joint ven-
ture established with Neftegazovaya Kompaniya Itera (NGK Itera).32 NGK Itera’s 
31 Прогноз долгосрочного социально-экономического развития Российской Федерации 
на период до 2030 года, http://economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/macro/prognoz/
doc20130325_06 
32 As a joint venture established with Itera. The joint venture produces 12.6 billion m3 of gas 
a year (2011 figure), mainly from the Beregovoye field (in operation since 2001) and the 
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contribution to the joint venture included 49% of shares in the Purgaz gas field 
(the remaining 51% was owned by Gazprom), 49% of shares in the Sibneftegaz 
company (the remaining 51% was owned by Novatek at that time) and 67% of 
shares in the Uralsevergaz gas trading company. In exchange, Rosneft trans-
ferred 100% of shares in the Kynsko-Chaselskoye Neftegas to NGK Itera and 
paid US$ 173.4 million.
In December 2013 Rosneft purchased 51% of shares in Sibneftegaz from Novatek, 
thus acquiring full control (100% of shares) of the company. In 2014, it finalised 
the takeover of NGK Itera, thus consolidating its assets. In 2013, Rosneft took 
over the TNK-BP company. The company has also acquired stakes in several 
important gas joint ventures (see Table 3 for a detailed specification). The launch 
of a gas pipeline connecting the Vankor field with Gazprom’s pipeline system 
also contributed to the company’s growing sales by enabling Rosneft to utilise 
an extra 8.2 billion m3 of associated gas produced at the Vankor field. 
In May 2013 Rosneft declared that it was interested in buying the gas assets of 
the Russian Alrosa company (the fields are in Western Siberia, near the Berego-
voye and Pyreynoye fields). Rosneft initially intended to have completed the ac-
quisition of Alrosa’s gas subsidiaries, Geotransgaz and Urengoyskaya Gazovaya 
Kompaniya, by the end of 2013. However, the transaction has not been finalised 
yet because no agreement could be reached about determining the value of the 
companies to be sold.33 
Rosneft	has	been	systematically	increasing	the	volume	of	its	gas	contracts	
with	domestic	consumers. In 2015, Russia’s largest oil company delivered 
58.7 billion m3 of gas to domestic consumers. Back in 2013 the company revealed 
that under the contracts already concluded, the total of volume of domestic sup-
plies as of 2016 would reach 72 billion m3 of gas per year. The company’s ma-
jor contracts include the deal concluded in September 2013 for the supply of 
4 billion m3 of gas to OGK-5, owned by Italy’s Enel, in the years 2014–2025; the 
Gubkinskoye field (in operation since 2007). The production potential of these two fields is 
11 billion m3 and 15 billion m3 of gas a year, respectively. Itera sells around 22 billion m3 of 
gas in the domestic market (2013), of which 12.6 billion m3 is gas extracted by the company 
(2011), and the remainder is purchased from third parties (it had a contract with Novatek, 
valid to 2016, for the supply of 7 billion m3 of gas a year). 
33 Газовый бизнес Роснефти: независимым придется потесниться, Нефтегазовая Вер­
тикаль, Issue 5, 2014, p. 38–43; "АЛРОСА" и "Роснефть" возобновят переговоры по газовым 
активам в следующем году, http://www.finmarket.ru/database/news.asp?fid=88885&l=42
&fs=T&id=4036400
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contract for the supply of gas to Russian power plants owned by the Finnish 
company Fortum to 2019, concluded in September 2013; the 2012 deal for the 
supply of a total of 4.65 billion m3 of gas in the years 2013–2015 to the E.ON 
power plants in Russia; the 2012 contract for the supply of 875 million m3 of 
gas a year to Inter RAO for the years 2016–2040 (the contract provides for the 
supply of a total of 32 billion m3 of gas). Moreover, Rosneft is still bound by 
the contracts, concluded in May 2014, for the supply of gas to Rusal, the Russia 
aluminium producer, EuroSibEnergo, the Eastern Siberian electricity compa-
ny, and the Russkie Mashiny industrial complex. Rosneft will supply a total of 
20 billion m3 of gas per year to those companies to 2029.34 
The volume of Rosneft’s contracts for supplies to domestic consumers exceeds 
the company’s current production capacity and Rosneft buys some of the gas it 
supplies from third parties (13.3 billion m3 in 2014). In order to meet its new con-
tractual obligations, the company will have to considerably increase its output 
(which should prove to be difficult since the new fields may yield only 48.5 bil-
lion m3 in the years 2018–201935), acquire new assets or purchase more gas from 
third parties. For these reasons, its objectives set in 2013, of increasing annual 
output to 100 billion m3 and reaching a 20% share in the Russian gas market, 
will be difficult to achieve.36 
Novatek	has also been expanding its portfolio of lucrative contracts. In October 
2015, the company and a Russian subsidiary of Italy’s Enel concluded a contract 
for the supply of 2 billion m3 of gas a year to the Nevinnomyskaya power plant 
in southern Russia for the period 2016–2018. 
5. resource base and prospects of gas production growth
The	main	actors	in	Russia’s	gas	market	have	very	ambitious	plans	concern-
ing	gas	production,	but	they	seem	unlikely	to	materialise.	
34 Роснефть поставит газ и нефтепродукты РУСАЛу, ЕвроСибЭнерго и «Русским маши-
нам», http://inosmip.ru/news/6593-rosneft-postavit-gaz-i-nefteprodukty-rusalu-evro si-
be ne rgo-i-russkim-mashinam.html 
35 The production forecasts for Rosneft’s gas assets in the years 2018–2019 are as follows: 
Rospan – 18 billion m3, Sibneftegaz – 15.5 billion m3, Karampur – 9 billion m3, the Kynsko-
Chaselsky group fields – 6 billion m3. Source: Rosneft to sign more gas contracts, Argus 
FSUE, 21.08.2014, s. 4. 
36 «Роснефть» бросает вызов «Газпрому», http://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/ 
2013 /04 /24/rosneft_posopernichaet_s_gazpromom 
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Gazprom has declared that it is prepared to produce around 490–555 billion m3 
in 2020. Rosneft, too, has ambitious plans to increase its share of the domestic 
market. Back in 2013, the company’s CEO, Igor Sechin, announced that Rosneft 
was planning to increase production to 100 billion m3 a year by 2020, and the 
Rosneft deputy CEO, Vlada Rusakova, said that the company would account for 
20% of domestic gas supplies by 2020. Rosneft’s gas strategy, announced in De-
cember 2014, re-stated those objectives (i.e. the plan to become Russia’s second 
largest gas producer after Gazprom), but instead of the date 2020 it referred to 
the “medium-term perspective” without defining a specific period. Novatek’s	
plans no less ambitious – the company intends to increase its gas production to 
120 billion m3 by 2020. 
What	may	impede	the	implementation	of	those	plans	is	not	the	absence	
of	a	potential	to	increase	production,	but	rather	the	negative	projections	
concerning	domestic	consumption	and	the	prices	of	oil	and	gas,	as	well	as	
the	pessimistic	export	outlook.
The positive thing for Gazprom is that the company still has a lot of room to 
increase output. However, the gas fields in question are problematic because 
they are in areas which require ever greater investments to develop, such as 
the Yamal Peninsula, the Arctic shelf, Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far 
East. Gazprom is currently able to produce 1.7 billion m3 of gas per day, i.e. 
580–620 billion m3 a year. 
Novatek, too, has sufficient potential to expand production, especially in East-
ern Russia and the Yamal Peninsula. In Eastern Siberia, Novatek controls the 
third largest gas reserves, i.e. the Angaro-Lenski bloc 37(1.22 trillion m3 of gas), 
larger than all but the Kovykta and Chayanda fields. The company’s most prom-
ising project in terms of the potential to increase gas production is the SeverEn-
ergia undertaking implemented together with Gazpromneft (the gas produced 
is sold to Gazprom). Novatek’s main focus is on LNG production in the Yamal 
and Gydan Peninsulas38 (for more information on the LNG projects, see Part II). 
Rosneft	has	also	considerably	expanded	its	holdings.	In 2011 the compa-
ny was reported to have reserves of around 900 billion m3 but a mere three 
years later in December 2014 it announced that it had expanded its reserves to 
37 Gennady Timchenko holds 50% of shares in the Angaro-Lenski bloc via his company Petromir.
38 Внутренний рынок газа: как выйти из бермудского треугольника?, Нефтегазовая 
Bертикаль, Issue 13–14, 2015, p. 73.
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6.5 trillion m3, partly by taking over Itera and TNK-BP. The new acquisitions 
are both new and existing fields; the new ones include the Karampur field (with 
around 800 billion m3, or 906 billion m3 according to other estimates, and with 
a production capacity of 30 billion m3 a year), the Kynsko-Chaselskaya group 
(284 billion m3), Vankor, Rospan (formerly owned by TNK-BP), Sakhalin 3 (the 
Severo-Veninskoye field) and Sibneftegaz. The existing fields are mainly those 
formerly owned by Itera: Beregovoye (in operation since 2001) and Gubkinskoye 
(in operation since 2007). 
Given	the	persistent	negative	market	trends,	both	in	Russia	and	in	exter-
nal	markets,	the	Russian	gas	sector	is	unlikely	to	achieve	the	long-term	
targets	set	out	in	the	Energy	Strategy	to	2030,	i.e. an increase in gas produc-
tion to 803–837 billion m3 a year in the years 2020–2022, and to 885–940 billion 
m3 a year by 2030. 
Table 5. Projections for gas production in Russia 39
russia’s Energy strategy until 2030 39
2013–2015 2020–2022 2030
Projected gas output (billions of m3) 685–745 803–837 885–940
General scheme of Gas industry development until 2030
2015 2020 2025 2030
Projected gas output (billions of m3) 781–845 850–941 871–974 876–981
Author’s own compilation based on figures published in the successive versions of the Energy Strategy of 
the Russian Federation and the General Scheme of Gas Industry Development until 2030. 
The outlook for gas consumption in the domestic market is less than optimistic 
(see Part II for more information). The competitive advantage of Russian gas 
in the European markets, however, may offer some opportunities for increas-
ing the volume of exports. In 2016, the average price of Russian gas for the 
EU was US$ 167 per 1000 m3 (for comparison, back in January 2015 it was US$ 
305 per 1000 m3). The prices at gas hubs were higher: US$ 243.51 per 1000 m3 
at the TTF and US$ 245.28 per 1000 m3 at the NCG. The falling prices have led 
39 Энергeтическая стратегия России на период до 2030 года, Moscow 2009, http://minen-
ergo.gov.ru/node/1026 
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to increased gas exports to Germany (3.6 billion m3 in June 2016, 20% more 
than in May 2016).40 
The restrictions which the so-called independent gas producers face when try-
ing to access the Gazprom-owned gas transmission network	are	one	of	the	
barriers	holding back the growth of gas production. The independents have 
been increasingly using this argument when lobbying for liberalisation of the 
Russian gas market. To some extent, the problems are gradually being over-
come. In 2014, a gas pipeline was launched which connected the Vankor field to 
a LUKOIL-owned gas pipeline in Western Siberia, which, in turn, is connected 
to Gazprom’s gas pipeline system at the Yamburg node. 
One	of	the	Russian	gas	sector’s	biggest	current	challenges	is	to	expand	the	
available	gas	reserves,	since	output	growth	in	Russia	has	recently	been	
achieved	mainly	by	renewing	extraction	in	old	fields	instead	of	develop-
ing	new	ones.	
The difficult-to-access fields are yet to be put into operation. They include the 
Yamal fields (Krusenshtern, Kharasavey, the Tambey Group), Eastern Siberian 
fields (Kovykta, Chayanda) and offshore fields (especially the Shtokman field). 
Several problems impede their potential development. Firstly, the fields are 
located far from the potential gas consumers. Secondly, they are in regions with 
exceptionally harsh environmental or climate conditions. Thirdly, the new gas 
production centres have insufficiently developed infrastructures. And finally, 
some of them contain gas which needs to be highly processed before it can be 
used, in addition to deposits of other resources such as helium in the case of the 
Eastern Siberian fields. 
The Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation expects that gas production in 
Russia will increase to 655 billion m3 in 2018 and that gas producers will invest 
around RUB 813 billion (US$ 12.6 billion) in the upstream sector and a further 
RUB 1.6 billion into transport infrastructure in the years 2016–2018.41 If Russia’s 
total gas production is to increase in line with the stated objectives to 1 trillion 
m3 a year by 2030, then very costly preparatory works will have to be carried 
out. According to calculations by the industry journal Neftegazovaya Vertikal, 
40 Gazprom price falls below hub levels, Argus FSUE, 9.07.2015, s. 4; Газпром: Цена на газ в ЕС 
в 2017 г составит $180-190 за тыс кубов, http://1prime.ru/INDUSTRY/20170228/827193654.
html 
41 Gas output to rise, Argus FSUE, 29.10.2015, s. 5. 
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in order to maintain the production volume of around 650 billion m3 a year and 
thus reach a total volume of around 10 trillion m3 in the years 2016–2030, it will 
be necessary to develop fields with reserves of around 15 trillion m3 (according 
to the General Scheme of Gas Industry Development until 2030, it might even 
be necessary to develop deposits of around 25–26 trillion m3). The cost of ena-
bling gas extraction in fields containing around 15 trillion m3 of gas has been 
estimated at US$ 23–28 billion a year, which is much less than Gazprom’s total 
investment in geological works and the gas upstream segment in general. Al-
though attracting foreign investors could be a way to raise the funds needed, 
Gazprom has so far been reluctant to create the mechanisms for co-operation 
needed to enable such investments.42 
The necessary measures seem even less likely to materialise if one considers 
the evolution of gas reserves in the existing strategic fields, which constitute 
the resource base of gas production in Russia. In the years 2002–2013, a total 
of 6.56 trillion m3 of gas was produced in Western Siberia, but the reserves de-
creased by 3.4 trillion m3 in the same period as new reserves of around 3.16 tril-
lion m3 were developed. However, in the total volume of the new reserves in 
Western Siberia, only 180.9 billion m3 was in new fields. The evolution of off-
shore reserves looks slightly better: the total reserves of 5.23 trillion m3 include 
3.5 trillion m3 in the so-called old fields in the Barents Sea and the Kara Sea 
and 1.73 trillion m3 in new fields (mainly Gazprom-owned fields in the Sea of 
Okhotsk and the Kara Sea).43 However, with the current persistently low gas 
prices, the exploitation of shelf deposits remains unprofitable. 
6. development of domestic gas infrastructure
6.1. The transmission network
Russia has the world’s most extensive gas pipeline network, which consisted of 
171,200 kilometres of pipelines in 2015. The gas transmission infrastructure in 
Russia is owned by Gazprom. 
42 As illustrated by the small number of joint upstream projects with European companies 
and the reluctance to accept undertakings entailing the involvement of Chinese companies 
in the Russian gas upstream sector, despite the interest in such projects expressed by the 
Chinese side.
43 Нефтегазовая Вертикаль, Issue 16, 2015, p. 51–60. 
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In the years 2001–2014, more than 20,000 km of new gas pipelines were built in 
Russia, which considerably improved the level of access	to	the	gas	network. 
Over the last 15 years, access rates increased from 49.8% in 2000 to 66.8% 
in 2016. Currently, access to the gas distribution networks is higher in cities 
(70.4%) than in rural areas (56.1%). Gazprom’s investments in the development 
of the gas network have also increased from RUB 9 billion in 2005 to a record 
level of RUB 33.9 billion a year in 2013.44 
Still, these rates are much lower than predicted in the plans announced in 2009, 
when Gazprom pledged to achieve universal access to gas networks by 2015. 
Moreover, during the last two years Gazprom started to scale down its invest-
ments in gas network expansion: in 2016, it planned to spend RUB 25 billion on 
such projects.45 
On the other hand, the	existing	domestic	transmission	infrastructure	is	
largely	worn	out. According to Gazprom, in 2012 the infrastructure was 70% 
through its useful life on average, and 90% in the case of compressor stations. 
The average age of Russia’s main gas pipelines was higher than 23 years. While 
back in 2004 gas pipelines older than 33 years accounted for around 17% of the 
entire transmission infrastructure, in 2014 that percentage was already 46%. 
Gas pipelines younger than 10 years, on the other hand, account for slightly less 
than 12% of the entire transmission infrastructure (see Table 6 for details).46 
Table 6. Age of gas pipelines in Russian territory
2004 2009 2014
total length of gas transmission infrastructure 
(thousands of km) 152.8 160.4 170.7
Gas pipelines in operation for less than 10 years (%) 11.1 9.8 12.1
Gas pipelines in operation for 11-20 years (%) 30.9 18.3 12.1
Gas pipelines in operation for 21-33 years (%) 40.7 44.5 29.6
Gas pipelines in operation for more than 33 years (%) 17.3 27.4 46.2
Author’s own compilation based on figures published by Gazprom. 
44 http://www.gazprom.ru/about/production/gasification/ 
45 "Газпром" сокращает расходы на газификацию РФ, http://www.ng.ru/economics/2016-
 07-22/4_gasprom.html
46 On the basis of figures disclosed in Gazprom’s annual reports in 2000–2015. 
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For	many	years,	Gazprom	has	been	investing	mainly	in	new	export	gas	
pipelines,	at	the	expense	of	maintaining	the	domestic	infrastructure. The 
company spends around RUB 150 billion a year on upgrading the transmission 
infrastructure, which is insufficient in view of the real needs, estimated at 1.5 to 
2 times as much.47 
6.2. Gas storage
Gazprom has also expanded its network of domestic gas storage facilities; how-
ever, their total capacity is lower than initially planned. In 2000, the compa-
ny’s total gas storage capacity was 57.8 billion m3, in 2005 – 62.6 billion m3, in 
2010 – 65.4 billion m3 (while the plans drafted in 2005 predicted that a capacity 
of 82 billion m3 would have been reached by that time), and in 2015 – 73.6 bil-
lion m3. 
6.3. Gas processing infrastructure in Russia 
The processing of natural gas consists mainly of separating the hydrocarbon 
fractions (ethane, propane, butane and their mixtures) from non-hydrocar-
bon components (nitrogen, helium, sulphur compounds). Gas condensate, 
which is often extracted in gas fields alongside dry gas, can also be processed 
to produce fuels. 
Currently there are more than 30 gas processing plants in Russia; the most im-
portant ones are owned by Gazprom, SIBUR and LUKOIL. Gazprom’s plants in 
Orenburg, Astrakhan and Sosnogorsk have the highest production capacity. 
Gazprom also has a helium processing plant in Orenburg, a condensate stabili-
sation plant in Surgut and a plant for preparing condensate for transportation in 
Novy Urengoy. The total production capacity of all the plants is 53.5 billion m3.48
Gazprom holds the largest share in the segment of raw natural gas process-
ing (accounting for 96% of Russia’s total raw natural gas processing). SIBUR, 
on the other hand, holds the highest share in the segment of associated gas 
processing (56%). 
47 Либерализация газового рынка: ломать не строить, Нефтегазовая Вертикаль, Issue 
1–2, 2016, p. 18. 
48 Газ. Добыча и переработка. Новая волна спада, Нефтегазовая Вертикаль, Issue 23–24, 
2014, p. 107–108. 
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The General Scheme of Gas Industry Development until 2030 predicted a dy-
namic development of the gas processing sector in Russia, which was expected 
to grow from 70.9 billion m3 in 2007 to 133–143 billion m3 in 2015, 246–278 billion 
m3 in 2025 and 243–275 billion m3 in 2030.49
However, the actual figures for the last ten years demonstrate that those pre-
dictions were unrealistic. According to figures from the Russian Ministry of 
Energy, the volume of gas processing increased from 62.7 billion m3 of gas in 
2006 to 71.9 billion m3 in 2015, i.e. was just over half of what the General Scheme 
had predicted (for detailed figures, see Table 7). 
Table 7. Natural gas processing in Russia in 2006–2016 (billions of m3)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
62.7 63.7 66.2 64.9 68.8 69.8 70.7 71.2 72 71.6 n/d*
* n/d – no data
Source: Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation. 
Gazprom is planning to build two large new gas processing plants, one in the 
northern part of the Tyumen Oblast and the other in Yakutia, but the plans are 
expected to be implemented no sooner than the mid-2020s. 
49 Генеральная схема развития газовой отрасли на период до 2030 года,  http://www.en-
ergyland.info/files/library/112008/7579b56758481da282dd7e0a4de05fd1.pdf. 
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ii. thE russian Gas sEctor’s Export stratEGy 
in 2000–2016
1. objectives of the gas sector’s export strategy
The	most	important	stated	and	actual	objective	of	Russia’s	export	strat-
egy	in	the	gas	sector	has	invariably	been	to	diversify	export	markets	and,	
to	that	end,	to	expand	the	gas	transmission	infrastructure. The expec-
tation was that those efforts would also indirectly involve the development 
of new gas fields, especially those in regions with harsh environmental or 
climate conditions, such as the Yamal Peninsula, the Arctic shelf, Eastern 
Siberia or the Far East. 
Under Vladimir Putin, Russia’s	export	strategy	has	effectively	been	regard-
ed	as	an	instrument	for	pursuing	economic	aims	as	well	as	political	objec-
tives of vital importance for the Russian state.
The most important economic	objective	has been to maintain, and in the 
longer term strengthen, the position of Russian gas in the strategically im-
portant European markets, and especially the most lucrative markets of the 
EU member states. The rationale behind the construction of new export gas 
pipelines has been not only to reduce transit dependence on third countries 
(especially Ukraine) but also to enable Gazprom to more flexibly respond to 
the changing situation, including changing demand, in the various segments 
of the European market. 
In view of the promising outlook for gas consumption in Asian markets, and 
especially China, Russia has also been aiming to launch gas supplies to China 
via a system of projected pipelines and in the form of LNG, bearing in mind the 
persistently high LNG prices in Asia. 
Since Vladimir Putin came to power, the gas sector has also served as an im-
portant instrument in the pursuit of Russia’s political	objectives.	Efforts to 
develop closer gas co-operation with other actors were often made with a view 
to building political influence in the states or groups of states concerned. The 
reason why Russia has tended to favour bilateral or regional co-operation in 
its relations with EU member states is because it wanted to render it more 
difficult for the EU institutions and member states to come up with a common 
energy policy based on principles that would run counter to Russia’s interests 
(such as diversification of gas supplies, reducing gas dependence on Russia, 
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or imposing rules on Russia’s presence in the EU market through regulato-
ry change). This tactic has been visible in Russia’s incessant efforts to push 
through its successive gas pipeline projects (Nord Stream 1, South Stream, 
Turkish Stream, Nord Stream 2), with the ancillary objective of building re-
gional ‘gas axes’. 
2. russia’s gas exports in the years 2000–2016: export destinations 
and volumes
Russia	has	not	managed	to	achieve	the	levels	of	gas	exports	projected	in	the	
strategic	documents	for	the	gas	sector	and	pledged	by	Gazprom. According 
to the General Scheme of Gas Industry Development until 2030, Russian gas 
exports were expected to reach 347–375 billion m3 of gas by 2015.50 The actual 
volume of Russian gas supplies to external markets was lower by as much as 
100 billion m3, mainly because of the drastic decline in exports to the post-Soviet 
countries, and especially Ukraine. 
Ukraine, which back in 2006 imported around 59 billion m3 of gas from Rus-
sia (a volume more than 10 billion m3 larger than the exports to Germany, 
currently the largest importer of Russian gas), used to be a key market for 
Gazprom in the post-Soviet area. However, Russian exports to Ukraine de-
clined systematically, reaching a level of 25.8 billion m3 in 2013. In the af-
termath of the political change in Kyiv, Russia unilaterally cancelled all the 
discounts previously granted to Ukraine and reinstated the high contractual 
price of US$ 486 per 1000 m3. This led to objections on the part of Kyiv, which 
demanded a replacement of the price formula stipulated in the 2009 gas con-
tract with a market mechanism. As the parties failed to reach agreement, in 
June 2014 Russia completely halted gas exports to Ukraine and introduced 
a system of prepayments. Supplies were resumed after agreement was reached 
on the so-called winter package,51 but the interruption in supplies for nearly 
six months resulted in a decrease in the 2014 yearly volume of supplies to 
14.5 billion m3. As a result of the diversification efforts undertaken by Kyiv, 
50 Генеральная схема развития газовой отрасли на период до 2030 года,  http://www.en-
ergyland.info/files/library/112008/7579b56758481da282dd7e0a4de05fd1.pdf
51 For more information, see: Sz. Kardaś, W. Konończuk, A. Łoskot-Strachota, Success? The 
Russia/Ukraine/EU gas agreement, OSW Analyses, 5.11.2014, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/analyses/2014-11-05/success-russia/ukraine/eu-gas-agreement 
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in 2015 gas supplies from Russia decreased yet again to 7.8 billion m3 ;52 and in 
2016 Ukraine stopped buying gas from Russia altogether.53 
Gas	supplies	to	the	EU	member	states	have	been	a	key	export	destination	
for	Gazprom	and	that	has	never	changed	during	the	last	sixteen	years. 
The largest EU buyers of Russian gas include Germany, Italy, France and the 
member states of the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and 
Hungary). In recent years, (2013–2016) supplies to the British and Dutch mar-
kets have been surprisingly high, mainly because Gazprom increased its share 
in the volume of gas bought by those countries from European intermediaries.
Turkey	remains	the	largest	non-EU	market	for	Russian	gas. The volume of 
supplies increased by more than 150% in the years 2002–2015, from less than 
12 billion m3 in 2002 to 27 billion m3 in 2015 (in 2016 exports to Turkey decreased 
slightly to 24.7 billion m3). 
Figures on the volumes of Russian gas transmitted via the export pipelines and 
data on Russian gas exports quoted by the Central Bank of the Russian Federa-
tion (see Appendix II) show that the share of Russian gas in external markets 
is lower than indicated in Gazprom’s statistics. That is because the latter show 
total volumes of gas supplied to individual countries, which often include some 
quantities of gas from Central Asia and small amounts of gas from Azerbaijan, 
as well as certain quantities of gas bought by Gazprom or Gazprom Export from 
trading companies operating in the European market. 
The proportion of gas imported from Central Asia in Russia’s gas exports has de-
creased considerably in recent years. Back in the years 2006–2008, the volume 
of such gas was 56.9–61.4 billion m3 a year, but in 2009 it decreased to 35.7 billion 
m3, in 2013 – to 28.5 billion m3, and in 2015 – to 19.2 billion m3 .54 Gazprom has 
been losing interest in Central Asian gas (mainly from Turkmenistan) because 
of the changing internal and external circumstances. Some of the gas from 
Turkmenistan used to be supplied to the southern regions of Russia, which is no 
52 For more information about Ukraine’s gas diversification, see: T. Iwański, Ukraine: successful 
diversification of gas supply, OSW Analyses, 3.02.2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
analyses/2016-02-03/ukraine-successful-diversification-gas-supply and statistics pu b li shed 
by Gazprom at www.gazprom.ru 
53 For more information, see: T. Iwański, Ukraine: a record year for Naftohaz, OSW Analyses, 
8.02.2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2017-02-08/ukraine-a-re-
cord-year-naftohaz 
54 Figures from the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation. 
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longer necessary since Gazprom expanded its own infrastructure, enabling it to 
supply cheaper gas from its own fields (according to the Kommersant newspaper, 
in 2015 the price of gas imported to Russia from Turkmenistan was US$ 200 USD 
per 1000 m3, i.e. four times as much as the price of gas produced by Gazprom). 
Moreover, using the Turkmen gas to deliver on Gazprom’s export obligations 
also ceased to be profitable, mainly because of the dwindling demand and falling 
prices in Russia’s traditional export markets (and especially the drastic decline 
in gas supplies to Ukraine, which used to be one of the main buyers of the Cen-
tral Asian gas re-exported by Gazprom).55 
The decline of gas imports from Central Asia, the fact that the Central Asian 
states no longer depend on Russia for transit (in particular, thanks to the gas 
pipeline network enabling gas exports to China, built in the years 2006–2015) 
and the dramatic decline in gas exports to Ukraine all mean that Russia has lost 
an important instrument of political pressure in its relations with some post-
Soviet states. The loss of the Ukrainian market has also been one of the principal 
external causes of the decline in Gazprom’s output. 
3. Existing and planned export pipelines 
Russia invariably remains the world leader in gas exports via pipelines (with 
a 27.4% share in total pipeline gas supplies).56 Despite its ambitious plans and 
pledges, Gazprom has not managed to genuinely diversify its gas export markets 
during the years 2000–2016. Europe is still the primary market of strategic 
importance, as the LNG supplies to Asian states continue to account for a small 
proportion of total exports. However, Russia has managed to diversify its export 
routes to the European market and reduce the share of gas from third countries 
(Central Asia) in its total gas exports. 
3.1. Diversification of export routes to Europe
In	recent	years,	Gazprom	successfully	diversified	its	gas	export	routes	to	
the	strategic	markets	in	European	states	and	Turkey. 
55 Sz. Kardaś, Rosja rezygnuje z turkmeńskiego gazu [Russia stops buying gas from Turkmeni-
stan], Analizy OSW, 29.07.2015, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2015-07-29/
rosja-rezygnuje-z-turkmenskiego-gazu 
56 Figures of the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2016, http://www.bp.com/con-
tent/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2016/bp-statistical-review-of-
world-energy-2016-full-report.pdf 
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While the Ukrainian	gas	pipeline	system is	still	the	main	export	route,	its	
importance	has	declined	considerably	over	the	last	sixteen	years. Back in 
2005, Russia sent more than 136.4 billion m3 of gas via Ukrainian territory to 
European markets and Turkey; by the end of 2014 that volume had decreased to 
62.2 billion m3. While it has increased again in 2016 to around 82.2 billion m3, it 
is still much lower than it was a decade ago. 
Table 8. Volume of Russian gas transit via Ukraine in 2005–2016 (w billion m3)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
136.4 128.5 115.2 119.6 95.8 98.6 104.2 84.3 86.1 62.2 67.1 82.2
Author’s own compilation based on figures published by Gazprom. 
Gazprom managed to decrease its transit dependence on Ukraine by launching 
three pipelines: Yamal-Europe, Blue Stream and Nord Stream. 
The construction of the Yamal–Europe pipeline started in 1994 and the pipe-
line was launched in 1999, though it did not reach its full transmission capacity 
(33 billion m3 of gas a year) until 2006. Since that time, the pipeline has been 
operating at almost maximum capacity. 
Blue	Stream,	via	which Russia exports gas across the Black Sea directly to 
Turkey, was put into operation in 2002. Russia uses around 80% to 90% of the 
pipeline’s total capacity of 16 billion m3. The construction cost of Blue Stream 
was US$ 2.4 billion.
Finally, Nord	Stream is the third main gas pipeline built to diversify Russia’s 
export routes to Europe. In September 2005, Gazprom and the German com-
panies BASF and E.ON signed a preliminary agreement to build a gas pipeline 
from Russia to Germany. In the same year they created the North European Gas 
Pipeline Company joint venture, renamed in late 2006 as Nord Stream AG. The 
final shareholders’ agreement was signed in July 2007 (with Gazprom taking 
51% of shares, Wintershall and E.ON 15,5% each, Gasunie and GDF Suez (cur-
rently Engie) 9% each). The construction of the pipeline started on 9 April 2010; 
the first branch came into operation on 8 November 2011 and the second in Oc-
tober 2012. The official total construction cost of the Nord Stream’s first two 
branches was EUR 7.4 billion. Their total capacity is 55 billion m3.57 In 2015 71.1% 
57 http://www.gazprom.ru/press/news/2010/april/article97229/; http://www.gazprom.ru/
press/news/2011/november/article122594/; http://www.gazprom.ru/press/news/2012/oc-
tober/article145481/ 
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of the pipeline’s total capacity was used (39 billion m3),58 and in 2016 – nearly 
80% (43.8 billion m3).59 
3.2. Plans for new export gas pipelines to Europe and their prospects
Gazprom	has	revealed	plans	to	build	many	new	large	gas	pipelines,	yet	the	
projected	pipelines	to	Europe	seem	to	be	the	ones	most	likely	to	materialise	
in	the	coming	years.	At	this	stage,	the	plans	to	build	new	branches	of	the	
northern	pipeline	(Nord	Stream	2)	and	one	branch	of	the	Turkish	Stream	
pipeline	seem	to	stand	the	best	chances	of	being	implemented. 
As regards the Nord	Stream	2 project, a shareholders’ agreement concerning 
the construction of two new branches of the pipeline was signed on 4 September 
2015 in Vladivostok. The deal was concluded between Gazprom and five large 
European companies, including Germany’s BASF, Austria’s OMV, Germany’s 
E.ON, the Dutch-British Shell and France’s Engie (formerly GDF Suez). The initial 
project envisages the construction of a gas pipeline from Russia to Germany with 
a total capacity of 55 billion m3 for a total cost of EUR 9.9 billion. The pipeline 
branches are due to enter operation by the end of 2019. The structure of financ-
ing has not yet been finalised: while Gazprom representatives have claimed that 
it would be completed by the end of January 2016, no details about the financing 
were known at the end of February 2017. The project is to be implemented by the 
Nord Stream 2 AG company (registered in Zug, Switzerland), in which Gazprom 
initially planned to take 51% of shares, with BASF/Wintershall, OMV, E.ON and 
Shell taking 10% each and Engie taking the remaining 9%.60 However, after the 
Polish competition authority raised reservations about the Western European 
companies acquiring shares in the company, they withdrew from the deal with 
Gazprom. This does not mean that the project is now shelved, but Gazprom will 
have to develop new financing and implementation arrangements for it. Nev-
ertheless, the Russian company has officially applied for pipeline construction 
58 "Газпром" в 2015 году увеличил поставки газа по "Северному потоку", http://ria.ru/
economy/20160121/1362938594.html 
59 Среднегодовая загрузка «Северного потока» в 2016 году составила 80% – в ЕС 
поставлено 43,8 млрд куб. м газа, http://www.nord-stream.com/ru/informatsiya-dlya-
pressy/press-relizy/srednegodovaya-zagruzka-severnogo-potoka-v-2016-godu-sostavila-
80-v-es-postavleno-438-mlrd-kub-m-gaza-490/ 
60 On 12 November 2016 an agreement was signed in Tsarskoye Selo near St. Petersburg be-
tween Gazprom and Engie, which increased the French company’s stake in the Nord Stream 
2 consortium from 9% to 10%. Thus, Gazprom’s stake decreased from 51 to 50%, http://www.
gazprom.ru/press/news/2015/september/article245799/; http://www.gazprom.ru/press/
news/2015/november/article250782/ 
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permits to the relevant authorities in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany. 
Moreover, on 22 February 2017 Nord Stream 2 AG (currently owned 100% by 
Gazprom) announced that it had concluded an agreement with Allseas Group 
for the construction of the offshore section of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Con-
struction work is expected to be carried out in the years 2018-2019.61
Russia also still intends to build a new gas	pipeline	across	the	Black	Sea, but 
because of frequent modifications to the project, which have largely been po-
litically-motivated, the final shape and timeframe for the project will remain 
uncertain in the coming years. After scrapping the plans for South Stream in 
December 201462, president Putin announced a new plan to build a large gas 
pipeline under the working name of Turkish Stream. The plan is to build a pipe-
line across the Black Sea to Turkey to supply gas to southern Europe via a hub 
to be built on the Turkish-Greek border. 
Co-operation on the project was suspended in November 2015 because of the 
heightened political tensions between Moscow and Ankara after Turkey shot 
down a Russian aircraft. The project was reactivated after a new political rap-
prochement in Russian-Turkish relations, symbolically expressed in the decla-
ration on resuming work on the Turkish Stream, made by the presidents of the 
two states on 9 August 2016. On 10 October 2016, during president Putin’s visit 
to Istanbul, an intergovernmental agreement was signed on the construction 
61 https://www.nord-stream2.com/media-info/news-events/nord-stream-2-awards-pipe-
lay-contract-to-allseas-38/ 
62 South Stream was one of Gazprom’s largest and most expensive infrastructural projects. 
It envisaged the construction of a pipeline with a total length of 2430 km (925 km offshore; 
1505 km on land in Europe) and a capacity of 63 billion m3 a year, running from Russia 
via the Black Seat to Southern and South-Eastern Europe. In the years 2008–2010 Russia 
signed intergovernmental agreements with all the transit countries for the pipeline vari-
ants projected at that time. Joint ventures were established to build the pipeline sections 
in the individual transit states, and an international consortium South Stream Transport 
AG was created to build the offshore part of the pipeline. The routing of the pipeline was 
changed several times: the initial plan was to build two branches: the north branch (Bul-
garia, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia, Austria) and the south branch (Bulgaria, Greece, Italy). 
Later versions of the project only included a shorter version of the north branch. In the first 
stage of the project the four-branch offshore section was expected to be built (each branch 
with a capacity of 15.75 billion m3 a year) connecting the Russkaya compressor station near 
Anapa (Krasnodar Krai) with the Bulgarian coast near Varna via the exclusive economic 
zone of Turkey. The pipeline was to transmit Russian gas via Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, 
Slovenia and Italy (Tarvisio). Source: Sz. Kardaś, E. Paszyc, At any price: Russia is embark-
ing on the construction of South Stream, OSW Commentary, December 2012, https://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2012-12-07/any-price-russia-embarking-
construction-south-stream 
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of the Turkish Stream (ratified by Turkey and Russia in December 2016 and 
February 2017, respectively). In December 2016 and in February 2017 contracts 
were signed between the Gazprom-controlled South Stream Transport B.V. com-
pany and Allseas Group AG for the construction of two offshore sections of the 
pipeline.63 
The revived project envisages the construction of two pipeline branches (with 
a capacity of 15.75 billion m3 each), one of which would supply gas to the Turk-
ish market while the other would carry Russian gas via Turkey to European 
markets. The project’s current scope is less ambitious than the original plans: 
in 2014, the objective was to build a pipeline with four branches and a total ca-
pacity of 63 billion m3 of gas a year (however, it only took until October 2015 for 
Gazprom to announce that the total capacity would be reduced to 32 billion m3). 
The cost of building the two branches was initially estimated at around EUR 
7 billion.64 However, statements made so far indicate that there is still no clar-
ity about the project’s final shape, the number of branches, capacity and route. 
The agreement signed is very generic, and the provision that it applies to the 
construction of two pipeline branches represents a success for Russia only on 
a superficial level. The Turkish side had previously advocated signing separate 
agreements, one for the pipeline that would supply gas to Turkey, and subse-
quently, a separate agreement for the transit pipeline. Gazprom, on the other 
hand, wanted to sign one agreement for all the planned branches. The inter-
governmental agreement stipulates that the construction of the transit branch 
will require an additional protocol to be signed. It also specifies that the offshore 
section of the pipeline will be built by Gazprom, and the onshore part by Turkish 
companies and a Russian-Turkish joint venture (the transit branch). The agree-
ment leaves many technical and financial details of the project unspecified (in-
cluding the routing and implementation costs). The parties have also agreed on 
a mechanism to calculate a discount for gas supplies to Turkey via the Turkish 
Stream (details are to be agreed in further negotiations). That mechanism, how-
ever, falls short of resolving the current Russian-Turkish price dispute whereby 
Ankara has been demanding a discount on its current gas supplies for two years. 
On 11 October 2016, the Gazprom CEO announced that a discount could come 
63 Подписан контракт на строительство первой нитки морского участка газопровода 
«Турецкий поток», http://www.gazprom.ru/press/news/2016/december/article295321/; 
Подписан контракт на строительство второй нитки морского участка «Турецкого 
потока», http://www.gazprom.ru/press/news/2017/february/article304014/ 
64 Две нитки «Турецкого потока» оценены в 7 млрд евро, http://www.vedomosti.ru/busi-
ness/articles/2016/12/21/670529-turetskogo-potoka-otseneni 
41
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
3/
20
17
with an increase in the volume of Russian gas supplies to Turkey (by around 
2 billion m3). The negotiations are thus set to continue in the coming months, 
which may delay the talks about the Turkish Stream implementation details.65
Irrespective of those difficulties, it seems that the construction of at least one 
branch of the pipeline, the one supplying gas to Turkey (with a capacity of 
15.5 billion m3 a year) may realistically happen by 2020. Firstly, Gazprom could 
use the pipes that have already been manufactured for the offshore section of 
the South Stream to build at least one branch of the Turkish Stream. Secondly, 
the Russian side has expanded its internal gas infrastructure in southern Russia 
to an extent that enables gas exports via a new pipeline across the Black Sea.66
Russia traditionally views building new gas pipelines as one of the ways to 
maintain, and in the longer term even strengthen, its position in the European 
market. The underlying objective is to increase the volume of Russian gas sup-
plies to the European market. The official justification points to a projected in-
crease in gas demand in Europe – according to Gazprom, demand for gas will 
increase by around 80 billion m3 to 2020 and by a total of around 200 billion m3 
to 2030, compared to 2014 levels.
An analysis of the current contracts for gas supply and the currently available 
transmission capacity and its utilisation suggests that Russia’s policy lacks any 
economic justification (in 2014 Russian exports to European states including 
Turkey were around 150 billion m3 while the available transmission capacity 
is more than 300 billion m3 a year67). Hence, political motivations seem to be 
key at this stage (limiting and ultimately eliminating Ukraine’s role as a transit 
country, strengthening political influence in selected EU countries and under-
mining solidarity among the EU members). 
In the long term, Russia may obtain some important legal benefits owing to its 
infrastructure development efforts (increasing transmission capacity may be 
65 M. Chudziak, Sz. Kardaś, W. Rodkiewicz, Turkey-Russia: partnership of convenience, OSW 
Analyses, 12.10.2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-10-12/turkey-
russia-partnership-convenience 
66 Россия и Турция вернулись к обсуждению проекта „Турецкий поток”, http://www.ve-
domosti.ru/business/articles/2016/07/27/650683-rossiya-turtsiya 
67 The total capacity of the first two branches of Nord Stream is 55 billion m3, of the Yamal-
Europe pipeline – around 33 billion m3, of the Ukrainian route – 179 billion m3 officially (in 
reality the figure is close to 142 billion m3), and of the Blue Stream pipeline (which supplies 
some of the gas exported to Turkey) around 16 billion m3. 
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an effective way to partly resolve the legal problems in Russian-EU gas rela-
tions). It may also benefit economically as the pipelines will enable it to influ-
ence gas prices in European spot markets. 
Nevertheless, Moscow’s gas pipeline projects implemented jointly with selected 
EU states currently serve as an instrument in the pursuit of Russia’s political	
aims	in	its	relations	with	Ukraine	and	the	European	Union.
The agreement on the construction of the 3rd and 4th branch of the Nord Stream 
and the plans concerning the Turkish Stream demonstrate that Russia is con-
sistently working to achieve its strategic objective, which is to build infrastruc-
ture that will enable	it	to	stop	transiting	gas	via	the	territory	of	Ukraine. 
If demand for gas transit via Ukraine were to remain constant at the 2016 level 
(around 82.2 billion m3), the two new branches of the Nord Stream would en-
able Russia to reduce transit via Ukraine to around 50 billion m3 a year, even 
if they were utilised at half of their capacity because of the restrictions im-
posed by the Third Energy Package. After building one branch of the Turkish 
Stream, Gazprom could stop using the Ukrainian system completely for gas 
supplies to Turkey (currently it sends around 14.5–15 billion m3 of gas to Turkey 
via Ukraine); and if two branches were built, Gazprom would be able to use the 
Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and increased utilisation of Nord Stream 168, to almost 
completely exclude the Ukrainian transit from the supplies of Russian gas to 
customers in the EU. 
Ukraine will be adversely affected even if those plans are implemented only 
partly, because its proceeds from transit will shrink, making maintenance of 
the Ukrainian gas pipeline network unprofitable (it is estimated that in order to 
break even, Ukraine needs to transmit at least 35–37 billion m3 of gas a year via 
68 Russia will be able to increase the utilisation of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline once Gazprom 
is authorised to use more capacity of the German OPAL gas pipeline (the land extension 
of Nord Stream 1). The European Commission issued a decision on the matter on 28 Octo-
ber 2016, which was nonetheless appealed by one of the German daughter companies of 
Poland’s PGNiG, as a result it is unclear when the decision will enter into force. Under the 
Commission’s decision Gazprom will be able to use 50% of the OPAL pipeline’s capacity 
without any restrictions and reserve another 40% through auctions. Thus, it will be able 
to increase the current utilisation of the Nord Stream 1 from the current 39 billion m3 to 
nearly 50 billion m3. For more information about the decision, see: A. Łoskot-Strachota, in 
co-operation with T. Dąborowski, Sz. Kardaś, The European Commission enables increased 
use of the OPAL pipeline by Gazprom, OSW Commentary, 9.11.2016, https://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2016-11-09/european-commission-enables-increased-
use-opal-pipeline-gazprom 
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its transit pipeline system). If the new branches of the Nord Stream and even 
one branch of the Turkish Stream were in place, that would also strengthen 
Moscow’s bargaining position in its talks with Kyiv about the necessary new 
short-term transit contract and other questions of economic as well as political 
importance.69
The expansion of Nord Stream and the construction of Turkish Stream are also 
an	important	political	tool	in	Russia’s	relations	with	the	European	Union. 
On the one hand, the projects are a way to consolidate political influence in the 
EU states concerned (in the case of Nord Stream that means Germany, but also 
France and the Netherlands; and in the case of Turkish Stream – countries in 
southern Europe including Italy and Greece). On the other hand, the pipelines 
are an important instrument for stirring up disunity among the EU member 
states. The conclusion of the agreement establishing the Nord Stream 2 consor-
tium triggered harsh political reactions in Central European countries70, which 
openly criticised the project itself as well as the EU states whose companies were 
involved in its implementation. 
The willingness of some states to get involved in Russian projects makes it easier 
for Moscow to pursue a policy of undermining unity within the EU. One direct 
consequence of that policy, which plays into Russia’s hands, is that Brussels is 
unable to pursue a fully coherent policy towards Moscow. The difficulties in 
reaching agreement within the EU about sanctions that would really hurt in 
response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine may serve as an example.
Russia’s pipeline policy may also prove useful in countering	some	of	the	con-
sequences	of	the	implementation	of	the	Third	Energy	Package. By increas-
ing the utilisation of the existing Nord Stream branches or by expanding the 
pipeline, Gazprom could avoid problems related to the need to reserve trans-
mission capacity in transit states (in particular, this refers to gas transported 
via Ukraine). 
69 Sz. Kardaś, K.Popławski, A. Łoskot-Strachota, Gas business as usual? The new agreements 
between Gazprom and EU energy companies, OSW Analyses, 9.09.2015, https://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-09-09/gas-business-usual-new-agreements-be-
tween-gazprom-and-eu-energy 
70 For more information, see. T. Dąborowski, J. Groszkowski, A. Sadecki, A. Łoskot-Strachota, 
Europa Środkowa i Południowo-Wschodnia wobec projektu Nord Stream 2 [Central and 
South-Eastern Europe on the Nord Stream 2 project], OSW Analyses, 14.10.2015, http://www.
osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2015-10-14/europa-srodkowa-i-poludniowo-wschod-
nia-wobec-projektu-nord-stream-2 
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Finally, Russia’s efforts to expand the pipeline network also serve some eco-
nomic	 objectives. The new infrastructure will offer it more flexibility in 
changing the routes of gas supplies to Europe if needed, and ultimately give 
Russia a means of influencing prices in the European gas market (with so many 
available options to deliver gas to Europe, Gazprom will be able to increase or 
decrease gas supply in the spot markets as needed, thus moving prices). Moreo-
ver, the Russian plan to increase the capacity of the Nord Stream may be in-
terpreted as a reaction to the EU’s stepped up efforts to expand LNG terminals 
(especially in the Baltic Sea region); the cheaper Russian gas supplied through 
the new infrastructure may have a significant competitive advantage over the 
more expensive liquefied gas delivered from the Middle East or potentially from 
the United States, and thus undermine the profitability of the LNG infrastruc-
ture on the Baltic Sea (and especially the Polish LNG terminal in Świnoujście).
3.3. Plans to build gas pipelines to China
After many years of negotiations, on 21 May 2014 in Shanghai the CEOs of 
Gazprom and China’s energy company CNPC, acting in the presence of the presi-
dents of Russia and China, signed a contract for the supply of Russian gas to 
China. The deal, concluded for thirty years, specifies that Russia will export gas 
to China from its Eastern Siberia fields (Chayanda and Kovykta) via the Power	
of	Siberia pipeline (Power of Siberia 1), to be built by 2019. The target volume 
of supplies is 38 billion m3 of gas a year. 
Russia is also sticking to the plans to implement the so-called Altai project (or 
Power	of	Siberia	2	according to Gazprom’s new nomenclature). On 9 November 
2014, during president Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing (on the eve of the APEC 
summit), a framework agreement was signed which defines the basic terms and 
conditions of a deal to supply 30 billion m3 of gas a year from Russia to China via 
the so-called western route (from Western Siberia to North-Western China). 
Finally, the third planned project concerns gas supplies to China via the Sakha-
lin	–	Khabarovsk	–	Vladivostok	pipeline. The memorandum between Russia’s 
Gazprom and China’s CNPC on pipeline gas supplies from Russia’s Far East to 
China was signed in Vladivostok in September 2015. 
Despite	the	difficulties	and	inevitable	delays,	the	Power	of	Siberia	1	pipe-
line	will	be	completed	because	both	sides	are	genuinely	interested	in	
making	the	project	a	reality.	Russia treats the expansion of its gas infra-
structure as an important element in the development of gas networks in 
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Eastern Siberia and the Far East. China, on the other hand, is mainly inter-
ested in the project because of the needs of the regional gas market in north-
eastern China. The construction of the new pipeline has been progressing 
systematically. In late February 2017 Gazprom announced that more than 
500 km of pipes had been laid.71 
There	is	still	no	visible	progress	in	the	negotiations	concerning	the	Power	
of	Siberia	2	(formerly	Altai) project	to build a pipeline connecting Russia’s 
fields in Western Siberia and the north-western provinces of China. Gazprom 
has been pushing for this project since 2006. If implemented, it would allow 
Russia to strengthen its bargaining position vis­à­vis European consumers, as 
the pipeline’s resource base spans the same fields from which gas is supplied 
to Europe (according to Gazprom, mostly the Zapolyarnoye field, with 3.3 tril-
lion m3 of gas, and the Yuzhno-Russkoye field, with 1.03 trillion m3 of gas). So 
far, only a series of framework agreements concerning the project have been 
signed. While representatives of the Russian leadership and of Gazprom have 
repeatedly stated that the contract could be signed soon, its conclusion in the 
near future looks increasingly unlikely.
Thus, Russia has still not managed to diversify its gas export markets. It was 
only in recent years (2014–2016) that binding legal bases were established and 
work really started on the development of infrastructure to enable the export 
of Russian gas to China. However, the Chinese project, which will not be im-
plemented before the early 2020s, will be limited in scope and will certainly 
not offer an alternative to the strategically important European market in the 
next two decades. Besides, the Power of Siberia pipeline now under construc-
tion will use a different resource base (the Eastern Siberian fields) than the one 
currently used to carry out gas supplies to the European market (the Western 
Siberian fields). 
4. LnG projects
While representatives of Gazprom and the Russian leadership have repeatedly 
announced plans for expansion in the LNG sector, the results so far have been 
unimpressive. According to the projections in the General Scheme of Gas Indus-
try Development until 2030, Russia was expected to produce between 15 and 
20 million tonnes of LNG in 2015, between 50 and 60 million tonnes in 2020 and 
71 «Газпром» отчитался о строительстве «Силы Сибири», http://izvestia.ru/news/667535 
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60 to 82 million tonnes beyond 2025.72 However, the Russian LNG sector lags 
behind the LNG industries in other states and regions, and the volumes men-
tioned here will be difficult to achieve. 
4.1. Projects in operation and in implementation
Russia presently has only one gas liquefying plant, launched in 2009 as part of 
the Sakhalin	2	project. Its shareholders include Gazprom (50% plus 1 share), the 
Dutch-British Royal Dutch Shell (27.5% minus 1 share), and the Japanese compa-
nies Mitsui and Mitsubishi (12.5% and 10% of shares respectively). Its current 
production capacity is 10.9 million tonnes a year; the target capacity is expected 
to be 15 million tonnes. Gazprom plans to further expand the terminal. A third 
production line as part of the Sakhalin 2 project is to be put into operation in 
202273 (and reach its full capacity of 5 million tonnes a year in 2023), although 
the final investment decision has not been taken yet (the estimated investment 
cost is US$ 7.4 billion).
The most advanced project is Yamal-LNG. Its shareholders include Novatek, 
Russia’s second largest gas producer after Gazprom (50.1% of shares), France’s 
Total (20% of shares), China’s CNPC (20% of shares) and China’s Silk Road Fund 
(9.9% of shares). The first production line (with a capacity of 5.5 million tonnes) 
was initially expected to be put into operation in 2016 but will ultimately be 
launched in 2017 at the earliest, followed by the second production line in the 
years 2017–2018, and a third one in 2018–2019. The plant is expected to have 
a total capacity of 16.5 million tonnes. The total cost of the project is anticipated 
to be US$ 27 billion. 
4.2. Projects in the planning phase
The other LNG projects put forward by Russian companies are in the planning 
phase. Given the current situation in the LNG market, i.e. the falling prices and 
the prospect of new strong players entering the market in the coming years 
(Australia, USA, Canada), the new Russian LNG projects are unlikely to be im-
plemented within the next 10 years.
72 Генеральная схема развития газовой отрасли на период до 2030 года,  http://www.en-
ergyland.info/files/library/112008/7579b56758481da282dd7e0a4de05fd1.pdf 
73 The initial plan was to launch a third installation to be initiated in 2018–2019. 
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Gazprom has announced plans to build two gas liquefaction plants: in Russia’s 
Far East as part of the Vladivostok LNG project, and on the Baltic Sea as part of 
the Baltic LNG project. The Vladivostok	LNG project, currently owned solely by 
Gazprom, was planned to be launched in 2018 (the first installation with a pro-
duction capacity of 5 million tonnes) and expanded by 2020 (another installa-
tion with a capacity of 5 million tonnes). While the so-called final investment 
decision on this expensive undertaking (whose cost was estimated in 2015 at 
around US$ 12 billion) was taken back in February 2013, so far the Russian gas 
giant has not undertaken any concrete actions. Moreover, in 2015 Gazprom sig-
nalled that it might shelve the project. Currently, Vladivostok LNG is suspended, 
as confirmed by the Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller, who said after the company’s 
general assembly of shareholders in June 2016 that the project’s implementa-
tion would depend on the development of the price situation in Asian markets.
Gazprom is also planning to build an LNG plant near the Russian port of Ust-
Luga (Baltic	LNG). The terminal, with a total production capacity of 10 million 
tonnes, was initially expected to be put into operation in 2018 (the estimated 
cost of the project is around US$ 10 billion), but in 2016 Gazprom announced 
that it would be launched in the years 2021–2022 (the first installation is to be 
operational in 2021, and the plant is to reach full capacity of 10 million tonnes 
in 2022). The first memorandum concerning the project was signed with the 
authorities of the Leningrad Oblast in June 2013. In June 2016 Gazprom signed 
a special memorandum concerning the LNG plant with the Dutch-British Shell 
company, which could potentially become one of the project shareholders. 
Moreover, in July 2016	it	was suggested that Japanese energy companies could 
the project.
Rosneft	has also announced plans to build its own LNG plant. The project’s 
working name is Far	East	LNG and it is expected to be implemented jointly with 
the company’s partners working together with Rosneft on the Sakhalin 1 con-
sortium. Apart from Rosneft (with 20% of shares), the consortium includes the 
US firm, Exxon Mobil (30%), India’s ONGC (20%) and Japan’s SODECO (30%). The 
plants will have a capacity of 5 million tonnes and its cost has been initially esti-
mated at around US$ 19 billion. According to initial plans, the plant is expected 
to be built near the De-Kastri port in Russia’s Far East (Khabarovsk Krai). 
Another LNG project has been planned by Novatek. In December 2013, the 
company’s representatives stated that a new LNG plant in the Yamal Penin-
sula (named Arctic	LNG), with a target total capacity of 15–16.5 million tonnes, 
could be built in the years 2018–2025, with the first installation expected to be 
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operational in 2018–2022, the second – in 2019–2024 and the third in 2020–2025. 
The resource base would consist of gas from the Utrenneye and Geofizicheskoye 
fields in the Gydan Peninsula. In October 2014, the project was granted an LNG 
export licence.74 Its cost is currently estimated at US$ 13.5 billion.75 In connec-
tion with the project, Novatek has expressed interest in buying four fields in the 
Yamal Peninsula from Gazprom (Severo-Tambeyskoye, Zapadno-Tambeyskoye, 
Malygin, Tasiyskoye).76 
4.3. The reasons for delays in Russia’s LNG projects implementation
The first LNG export licences were granted to Russian companies in 201477 but, 
contrary to an earlier ambitious declaration, the LNG sector has been stagnating 
for over a year. The	progress	of	the	LNG	projects	has	been	so	underwhelming	
primarily	because	of	the	absence	of	a	clear	gas	strategy	and the inconsistent 
moves by the Russian state leadership and Russian energy companies. 
Firstly, when it comes to the development of energy infrastructure, the con-
struction of new gas pipelines has been the priority. Secondly, both the govern-
ment and Gazprom had played down important developments in external gas 
markets. The shale gas revolution in the US has been crucial in this context as 
it turned the United States from a potential LNG importer (also from Russia) 
to a country with good chances of becoming one of Russia’s main competitors 
in the gas export markets within the next 3 to 5 years. Thirdly, the Russian 
government has been unable to establish a hierarchy of the planned projects 
(except for the Yamal LNG which is already being implemented). The competi-
tion between the Far Eastern LNG projects of Gazprom and of Rosneft, both of 
which expected support from the state, was also one of the reasons why the 
74 НОВАТЭК получил 3 лицензии на Гыдане на экспорт СПГ, http://neftegaz.ru/news/
view/135086-NOVATEK-poluchil-3-litsenzii-na-Gydane-na-eksport-SPG 
75 Новый проект «Новатэка» по производству СПГ обойдется не менее чем в $10 млрд, 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2016/11/22/666382-proekt-novateka 
76 Novatek eyes Gazprom fields, FSU Energy, Argus, 1.12.2016, p. 8. 
77 Yamal LNG received the Ministry of Energy’s gas export licence on 5 September 2014. In 
October of the same year it was granted export licences for its new LNG projects: Arctic 
LNG 1, Arctic LNG 2 and Arctic LNG 3 (from the Utrenneye and Geofizicheskoye fields in 
the Yamal Peninsula). In December 2013 Novatek announced that its projects (each with 
a projected capacity of 5 to 5.5 million tonnes a year) would be successively launched in 
the periods 2018–2022, 2019–2024 and 2020–2025. LUKOIL has not yet been authorised to 
export LNG despite efforts made, which is not surprising given the fact that the company 
has no fields where LNG could be produced. Novatek secures LNG export rights, Argus 
FSUE, 16.10.2014, p. 7. 
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Government postponed its decision. This decision was expected to be taken in 
the summer of 2015 but nothing has been decided as of yet. The legal disputes 
between Rosneft and Gazprom suggest that the rivalry is gaining momentum: 
Rosneft has been demanding access to the Gazprom-owned gas infrastructure 
in Sakhalin, thanks to which it could transmit around 8–10 billion m3 of gas 
a year to its future projected LNG plant. The company argues that the operation 
is technically feasible and only requires new compressor stations to be built, for 
which it is ready to pay.78 Gazprom has refused to grant such access for years 
and has lobbied the government to force the Sakhalin 1 consortium to sell the 
gas it produces to Sakhalin 2, but Rosneft has consistently rejected the terms 
offered by Sakhalin Energy. 
Another	 important	 factor	 concerns	 the	Western	 financial	 sanctions	
against	Russia	imposed	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Russian	aggression	against	
Ukraine. They have adversely affected the condition of the Russian energy 
companies and thus delayed the implementation prospects of the costly LNG 
projects.
Even	the	shareholders	of	the	most	advanced	LNG	project,	i.e.	Yamal	LNG,	
have	stumbled	on	serious	problems	in finding financing for the project. Be-
cause Novatek (the main shareholder of Yamal LNG) and Gazprombank (one of 
the main Russian lenders to the project) were subject to the US sanctions that 
limited Novatek’s ability to raise external financing, the completion of talks 
with banks was delayed by nearly two years. It was only in 2016 that agree-
ments were concluded with Russian banks (Sberbank and Gazprombank will 
lend EUR 3.6 billion to the project) and Chinese banks (EUR 9.3 billion and CNY 
9.8 billion.)79 Because of the difficulties, Novatek considered selling a further 9% 
of its shares in the Yamal LNG project to external investors (another Chinese 
or Indian company). 
Gazprom	has	been	struggling	with	even	greater	problems	to	finance	its	
LNG	projects. Gazprombank is the only potential external investor to finance 
78 Rosneft filed the lawsuit at the arbitration court in Sakhalin. The verdict, the announce-
ment of which was postponed repeatedly (at the request of Sakhalin Energy after Rosneft 
found itself in the list of entities under US sanctions) was ultimately give in February 
2015 and rejected Rosneft’s demands. A separate procedure was launched in August 2014 by 
the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service. 
79 НОВАТЭК все еще ждет китайских денег, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2944696; 
«Ямал СПГ» получит от банков Китая кредиты на €9,3 млрд и 9,8 млрд юаней, http://
tass.ru/ekonomika/3249817 
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Gazprom’s projects (solely in the case of Vladivostok LNG and jointly with WEB 
in the case of Baltic LNG), but since it has been subject to the US sanctions, its 
ability to obtain external financing has been considerably limited. In the case of 
Gazprom, another factor concerns the US sanctions imposed on the Yuzhno-Ki-
rinskoye field in Sakhalin, which was the potential resource base for a planned 
third LNG production line as part of the Sakhalin 2 project.80 
Rosneft, which is also subject to the US sanctions, has likewise been facing 
problems with obtaining external financing.
While the sanctions do not directly affect the Russian LNG projects in terms 
of access to technology, the gas companies are concerned that a possible ex-
tension of the sanctions could apply to that aspect as well. All the companies 
in question depend on Western technology and equipment to implement their 
projects, which makes them susceptible to US and European sanctions. For ex-
ample, gas production in Gazprom’s Yuzhno-Kirinskoye field depends entirely 
on technology and equipment imported from Europe. US companies such as 
General Electric (one of the main suppliers of compressors for LNG plants) are 
not allowed to work with projects in which companies subject to sanctions hold 
controlling stakes. The Russian deputy minister for energy Kirill Molodtsov 
confirmed this when he said that access to liquefaction technology was not the 
main problem, as Russia did have some domestic know-how in the field, gained 
in smaller-scale projects. The main problem, in his view, was the lack of certain 
kinds of equipment, i.e. mainly compressors. Russia would need years if not 
decades to develop domestic capacity in this area.81 
Nevertheless, Russian energy companies claim that the projects will be imple-
mented according to schedule. Gazprom is sticking to its ambitious plans in 
the LNG sector. In February 2015 the company’s representative announced that 
Gazprom planned to export 25 million tonnes of LNG a year by 2025.82 
Given the unimpressive progress so far, the mounting financial challenges and 
the unfavourable price situation in the LNG markets (especially in Asia), the 
80 США ввели санкции против крупнейшего месторождения «Газпрома» на шельфе, 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2015/08/07/604010-ssha-vveli-sanktsii-pro-
tiv-krupneishego-gazproma 
81 Competitive disadvantage, Argus FSUE, 9.10.2014, p. 2. 
82 "Газпром" планирует довести долю своего СПГ в торговом портфеле до 80%, https://
ria.ru/economy/20150203/1045609333.html 
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ambitious plans in the LNG sector seem unlikely to materialise in the coming 
years. Apart from financial issues, the projects would also face problems con-
cerning the resource base. If Gazprom wanted to simultaneously launch all its 
planned ‘eastern’ projects (Power of Siberia, Vladivostok LNG, the third LNG 
installation of Sakhalin 2), it would need around 54–55 billion m3 of gas a year 
from the Eastern Siberian and Far Eastern fields in the years 2020–2021, which 
is completely unrealistic. Thus, it seems increasingly likely that Gazprom and 
Rosneft will ultimately shelve their Far East LNG projects. 
4.4. Share of Russian companies in global LNG trade
Russian	companies	account	 for	a	 small	 share	of	 the	global	LNG	trade.	
Gazprom entered this market segment in 2005 and in the first four years its 
total turnover reached 1.2 million tonnes (around 1.7 billion m3). In August 
2008 a separate LNG company, Gazprom Global LNG Limited, was created. Over 
successive years its market share increased, mainly thanks to the launch of an 
LNG plant as part of the Sakhalin 2 project. In 2010 Gazprom’s total LNG sales 
reached 1.82 million tonnes (2.47 billion m3), of which gas from Sakhalin 2 ac-
counted for as much as 1.6 million tonnes (2.18 billion m3). In 2011, the results 
were much lower: even though total sales were 2.3 million tonnes (3.06 billion 
m3), Gazprom exported a mere 0.96 million tonnes (1.28 billion m3) from Sakha-
lin 2. In 2014, its exports amounted to 2 million tonnes (4.5 billion m3), of which 
around half came from the Sakhalin 2 project, and the remainder was bought in 
the gas market by its daughter company, Gazprom Marketing & Trading Lim-
ited (GM&T). In the years 2015-2016, Gazprom reported the fastest increase in 
LNG sales: by 4.7 and 4.9 billion m3 of gas a year, respectively (for full figures, 
see Appendix 1). 
Gazprom has recently concluded several new contracts for the supply of LNG. 
In 2012, its daughter company GM&T company signed a twenty-year deal with 
Gail India, under which it is going to supply 2.5 million tons of LNG a year as 
of 2018–2019.83 Moreover, on 27 October 2015 Gazprom Marketing & Trading 
Singapore (a daughter company of GM&T) signed a ten-year agreement with 
Pavilion Gas (daughter company of Singapore’s Pavilion Energy) for the supply 
83 In view of the changing market situation (falling prices in regional gas markets, includ-
ing the LNG market) Gail India entered into talks with Gazprom in 2016 to modify the 
terms and conditions of the twenty-year contract. Индийская GAIL хочет изменить 
контракт с «Газпромом» на поставку СПГ, http://www.vedomosti.ru/business/arti-
cles/2016/07/26/650526-indiiskaya-gail-gazpromom 
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of LNG to Asian markets. The agreement does not specify when the supplies are 
to commence or what their volume will be in particular years.84 
Gazprom plans to meet the above obligations using self-produced gas (around 
1 million tonnes from the Sakhalin 2 project), gas purchased from the Yamal 
LNG consortium (around 2.9 million tonnes destined mainly for Gail India) and 
gas purchased in spot markets (around 1 million tonnes a year). 
The company expanded the capacity of its LNG fleet to 800,000 m3 by buying 
two LNG tankers (the Velikiy Novgorod in January 2014 and Pskov in August 
2014). In total, Gazprom Marketing & Trading Limited has five tankers to ship 
LNG via the northern route. By 2020 the company plans to expand its fleet by 
another ten vessels.85 
Table 9. Russian production and export in 2009–2015 (millions of tonnes)
year output
Export
Japan south Korea taiwan china thailand Kuwait india
2009 5 2.84 1.02 0.12 0.19 - 0.31 0.51
2010 10.44 6.29 3.39 0.51 0.38 - 0.07 -
2011 10.49 7.18 2.82 0.18 0.24 0.06 - -
2012 10.92 8.31 2.17 0.06 0.38 - - -
2013 10.76 8.73 1.96 0.06 - - - -
2014 10.57 8.32 2 0.06 0.13 0.06 - -
2015 10.92 7.78 2.69 0.26 0.19 - - -
Author’s own compilation based on figures published by the World LNG Report in 2010–2016. 
Apart from Gazprom, the other Russian company involved in LNG trade is No-
vatek. However, it launched commercial operations in the LNG segment only 
in July 2016, by making a first delivery of LNG from Trinidad and Tobago to 
Chile. The volume of the company’s sale so far is rather small at 155,000 m3. 
84 «Газпром» подписал соглашение о поставке СПГ в Сингапур, http://www.vedomosti.
ru/business/news/2015/10/27/614489-gazprom-singapur 
85 Gazprom to boost LNG tanker fleet, Argus FSUE, 28.08.2014, s. 9. 
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According to the company’s representatives, the current objective is primarily 
to gain experience in LNG trading ahead of the expected launch of supplies from 
the Yamal LNG project in 2017.86 
5. the export outlook
In view of the current trends in external markets, including falling gas con-
sumption in Europe and the declining medium and long-term projections for gas 
demand not only in Europe but also in Asian markets, it does not seem realistic 
for Russia to considerably increase its exports.
Given the dynamics in external markets, the projections of increasing gas ex-
ports, as laid down in Russia’s strategic documents, seem completely unreal-
istic, both in the medium term and in the long term. According to the General 
Scheme of Gas Industry Development until 2030, Russia’s gas exports are ex-
pected to increase to 397–432 billion m3 by 2020 and to 415–440 billion m3 in the 
years 2025–2030. The assumptions of the Energy Strategy to 2030 have turned 
out to be slightly more realistic since the document predicted that Russia would 
export 282 billion m3 of gas in 2015, including 163 billion m3 to the EU and Tur-
key, 30 billion m3 to Asia and as much as 89 billion m3 to the CIS countries. The 
Strategy predicted that gas exports would increase to 336 billion m3 a year in the 
years 2016–2022 and to 363 billion m3 a year in the 2022–2030 period. 
The projections concerning rising gas consumption in the post-Soviet space have 
turned out to be the most inaccurate (for more information, see Part II, Chapter 2). 
As far as the EU	market is concerned, there are many indications that Russia 
will be able to maintain its current market share and in some periods slightly 
increase the volume of supplies, as it did in 2016. On the one hand, this is a con-
sequence of the fact that Russia has signed many long-term contracts (some of 
which do not expire until the 2030s) and that Russian gas prices still offer it 
a significant competitive advantage in the EU market. On the other hand, the 
efforts made by the EU member states to genuinely diversify their sources of 
gas supplies have not yet resulted in any meaningful qualitative change. While 
the infrastructure for LNG imports has been expanded, only around 20% of its 
capacity is being utilised. In 2015, the volume of LNG imported to Europe was 
50% of the volume received by European LNG terminals in 2011. The efforts to 
86 НОВАТЭК перепродал первый СПГ, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3032304; NOVATEK 
ships first LNG cargo, http://www.novatek.ru/en/press/releases/index.php?id_4=1255
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build new gas pipelines to diversify gas supplies to Europe have been even less 
effective. The only projects which are materialising are the TANAP and TAP gas 
pipelines being built jointly by Azerbaijan and Turkey, which are expected to 
supply around 10 billion m3 of gas a year to the EU market. The other projects, 
such as Galsi, EastMed or Baltic Pipe, are still in the phase of planning or initial 
arrangements. 
Tatiana Mitrova notes that in the short term, Russia’s export strategy will face 
major adaptation challenges related to the situation in the European market. 
The geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West will be another factor. 
Mitrova observes that the strategy has so far been improvised, as evidenced by 
the constantly changing plans for the construction of new gas pipeline infra-
structure connecting Europe with Russia: South Stream, Turkish Stream, the 
option to revive the South Stream pipeline in a modified form, Nord Stream 2; 
the plans to completely discontinue supplies via Ukraine or the option to keep 
some of the transit capacity. 
LNG imports from the United States, Australia or Papua New Guinea may theo-
retically pose a challenge to Russia in the European markets in the medium and 
long term. On the one hand, the low prices of gas and the high cost of liquefying, 
transport and re-gasification could make the offer of the LNG producers less at-
tractive than the price of gas offered by Russia, which can still compete thanks 
to the low costs of gas extraction in Western Siberia (US$ 3.5–4 per mmbtu). On 
the other hand, as the Western Siberian fields become depleted, the situation 
may change: gas production in the Yamal fields is much more expensive (US$ 
7–10 per mmbtu), and the cost of extracting gas in the Arctic shelf will be even 
higher (an estimated US$ 12–13 per mmbtu)87.
Because it is expected that considerable volumes of gas, mainly in the form of 
LNG, will be brought to the global market in the years 2018–2023,88 the competi-
tion among exporters will become tougher, making it harder for Russia to defend 
its share in the strategically important European market. It is not entirely clear 
if Russia is going to opt for a price war to hold on to its European market share 
87 T. Mitrova, Shifting Political Economy of Russian Oil and Gas, CSIS, March 2016, p. 46–47; 
cf. Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Great expectations: LNG on the European gas market, OSW Com­
mentary, 13.04.2016, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2016-04-13/
wielkie-nadzieje-lng-na-europejskim-rynku-gazu 
88 Figures of the World LNG Report, http://www.igu.org/publications/2016-world-lng-report
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(Tatiana Mitrova notes that there are no signs of such a strategy so far89), but it 
cannot be ruled out in the future. The auctions which Gazprom has been organ-
ising since 2015 may be a signal of a possible strategic adjustment of the trade 
policy towards its European customers.90 The auction mechanisms will prob-
ably continue to play an auxiliary role in relation to the execution of Gazprom’s 
export obligations under long-term contracts for some time (Gazprom sold only 
small volumes of gas in the auctions held so far: 1.2 billion m3 in the first one, 
0.42 billion m3 in the second one and 2 billion m3 in the third one). However, 
as the existing contracts gradually expire and in view of the expected lack of 
interest in renewing them, the share of Russian gas sales carried out through 
auctions may increase considerably.91 
Expansion in the Chinese	market may also prove to be problematic, especial-
ly in the short term. On the one hand, it is not a priority for Gazprom, which 
will be focused in the coming years mainly on European projects, especially 
the construction of new branches of the Nord Stream pipeline. On the other, 
Gazprom’s difficult financial situation, the problems with the development of 
East Siberian fields and the changing projections concerning future growth of 
gas consumption in China will continue to delay the implementation of joint 
Russian-Chinese projects. 
Because of Gazprom’s financial difficulties, the company’s inability to increase 
its investment budget from its own resources and the fiasco of the talks con-
cerning a loan to finance the gas pipeline to China, the company has reduced 
the budget of the Power of Siberia project: in 2015 it invested only around RUB 
30 billion, and the figure for 2016 was a mere RUB 72.2 billion compared to 
the originally planned RUB 200 billion.92 Consequently, it is now estimated 
that the pipeline will not be launched in 2018 as originally planned, but most 
89 Ibidem, p. 38. 
90 Gazprom, acting through its daughter company Gazprom Export, has so far organised 3 gas 
auctions: the first one took place on 7–10 September 2015, the second one on 15–17 March 
2016, and the third one – between 29 August and 2 September 2016. The first auction con-
cerned supplies via the Nord Stream pipeline exclusively, the second one was for the Baltic 
States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and the final one was again for supplies via the Nord 
Stream, but this time two additional delivery points of Baumgarten and Arnoldstein were 
added to the original ones (Greifswald, Gaspool and Olbernhau).
91 Sz. Kardaś, Aukcje gazowe: nowy instrument w polityce Gazpromu [Gas auctions: Gazprom’s 
new policy instrument], Analizy OSW, 7.09.2016, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/
analizy/2016-09-07/aukcje-gazowe-nowy-instrument-w-polityce-gazpromu 
92 «Газпром» в 2 раза снизил оценку инвестиций в «Силу Сибири» на 2016 год, http://
www.vedomosti.ru/business/news/2016/01/25/625388-gazprom-silu-sibiri 
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likely in 2020–2021, and the Khabarovsk gas processing plant (necessary to 
transform raw gas into an industrially usable form) will be operational no 
sooner than 2025. 
The slow progress of development works on the East Siberian fields has also 
contributed to the delays of the Russian-Chinese projects. The Kovykta and 
Chayanda fields will not reach their full capacity by the mid-2020s, which may 
mean that the upper ceiling of supplies provided for in the contract concluded 
between Gazprom and CNPC in May 2014 will be reached no sooner than the 
2030s. 
Moreover, the fluctuating projections concerning the real demand for gas im-
ports, especially those formulated in China, have been increasingly affecting 
the shape and implementation speed of the joint Russian-Chinese projects. The 
preliminary announcements made so far suggest that China may not need to 
import any gas from Russia beyond the volume ordered under the contract con-
cluded in May 2014. That would make a fiasco of Russia’s plans concerning the 
construction of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, exports of gas via the Sakha-
lin – Khabarovsk – Vladivostok route, and the possible LNG supplies to China 
from the Vladivostok LNG, which Gazprom is still considering. 
The prospects of exports to Asia may turn out to be less promising than initially 
expected. While the role of gas in China’s energy mix is set to increase, at the 
same time its demand for energy will decline due to the economic slowdown and 
energy efficiency improvements. In any case, China maintains a very diversi-
fied portfolio of suppliers. China’s	motivations	to	import	gas	from	Russia	are	
not	as	strong	as	in	the	case	of	oil. On the one hand, the Chinese economy is less 
dependent on gas imports (in 2014, imports accounted for 31% of the country’s 
total natural gas consumption, i.e. 58 billion m3 out of 183 billion m3). On the oth-
er hand, the capacity of the currently existing gas pipelines from Central Asia 
and Myanmar is 70 billion m3 and is set to increase to 90 billion m3 by the end 
of the decade. In 2014 China used only half of that capacity, importing a mere 
31 billion m3 via pipelines. In 2015, the consumption and import of gas remained 
at roughly the same level of 191 billion m3 and 62 billion m3 respectively. Moreo-
ver, the capacity of China’s LNG terminals, via which the country receives less 
than half of its gas imports, has also been growing. Even if the planned Power 
of Siberia pipeline were to be used at full capacity, supplies from Russia would 
still correspond to only half of the volume that China imports from Central 
Asia and would have to compete with LNG imports. China has been dynami-
cally implementing its LNG terminals development programme, which is set to 
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considerably increase Beijing’s bargaining position in talks about gas imports 
from Russia. In the years 2013–2015, as many as eleven LNG terminals were put 
into operation, with a total re-gasification capacity of 32.4 million tonnes. Thus, 
as of early 2016 China had a total of seventeen terminals with a total capacity of 
54.6 million tonnes, i.e. around 75.3 billion m3 a year.93 
93 M. Kaczmarski, Sz. Kardaś, ‘The oil friendship’: the state of and prospects for Russian-
Chinese energy cooperation, OSW Commentary, February 2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2016-02-17/oil-friendship-state-and-prospects-russian-
chinese-energy
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iii. Gas marKEt rEForm: pLans and prospEcts 
The plans for a comprehensive, structural reform of the Russian gas sector 
have been widely debated in Russia since the early 2000s. The first serious 
proposals in this context were put forward in July 2000 by the then minis-
ter for trade and economic development, Herman Gref, in a document enti-
tled The Social & Economic Policy Programme 2000–2010 (the Gref	Plan). 
The strategy nonetheless contained only very general proposals to divide 
Gazprom, grant access to gas pipelines to independent producers, include 
transport and extraction costs in gas prices and resolve the problem of gas 
debt between Gazprom and internal customers.94 The need to gradually im-
plement changes in the gas sector was also signalled in the successive ver-
sions the Russia's Energy Strategy and in the General Scheme of Gas Industry 
Development until 2030. 
The sections below discuss the sector’s most important problems which, on the 
one hand, have been constantly evolving and, on the other hand, have been the 
subject of debates between the advocates and the opponents of reform. 
1. advocates and opponents of reform
The so called independent	gas	producers	in	Russia,	and especially Novatek 
and Rosneft, are	the	initiators	and	the	main	advocates	of	reform. However, 
it should be noted that while calling for reform and the liberalisation of the gas 
market, they do not analyse the potential consequences from the point of view 
of sector as a whole, but are guided strictly by their own particular interests. 
The Federal	Anti-Monopoly	Service	also advocates systemic change.	Its chief, 
Igor Artemev, has repeatedly called for a division of Gazprom and made the case 
for price liberalisation. Some of these proposals also have the support of the 
Ministry	for	Economic	Development.95 
94 K. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, Russian gas industry – current condition and prospects, OSW Studies, 
April 2001, p. 9, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/prace_1_5.pdf 
95 Руководитель ФАС заявил о неизбежности разделения «Газпрома», http://www.vedomo-
sti.ru/business/news/2015/10/30/615031-fas-zayavil-neizbezhnosti-razdeleniya-gazproma; 
Вопрос о разделении "Газпрома" может быть рассмотрен до конца года, http://www.
newsru.com/finance/16oct2015/gzprm2split.html. 
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Gazprom,	for obvious reasons, is	against	reform, and the Russian Ministry of 
Energy backs many of its arguments.96 
2. Liberalisation of prices and the problem of transmission tariffs
The prices of gas in the internal market are one of the most serious problems 
affecting the Russian gas sector.  
Gradual price liberalisation was previously envisaged in the draft gas sector 
reform presented in the Russian government’s meeting on 7 December 2000. 
Prices were to be initially increased to US$ 50 per 1000 m3, with the aim of 
minimising any role of the state in regulating internal gas prices. 
In 2002, the government repealed the ‘frozen prices’ rule and started to gradu-
ally increase prices (by 20-25% a year) to stimulate investment and energy ef-
ficiency. The changes were also necessary in the context of the negotiations 
concerning Russia’s accession to the WTO. In 2006, another important decision 
was taken to accelerate the rate at which domestic prices were being aligned 
with export prices. However, the economic slowdown in 2013 forced the govern-
ment to stop the process. In 2007, the government introduced maximum and 
minimum prices: the minimum price is set by the Federal Tariffs Service, and 
the minimum price – by the government (and the difference between the two 
must not exceed 10%). The parameters of wholesale gas prices are defined by the 
government, and the Federal Tariffs Service approves the specific prices. Retail 
gas prices, on the other hand, are set by the governments of the regions of the 
Russian Federation. The so-called independent gas producers have the right to 
offer discounts of 10-15% compared to Gazprom’s prices. 
The so-called independent gas producers have been increasing their share in the 
internal gas supply markets thanks to their ability to offer much more attrac-
tive conditions than Gazprom can. Those companies offer contracts with prices 
between 3 and 10% lower than the regulated prices and the prices set by the Fed-
eral Tariffs Service. Novatek provides nearly 100% of gas in the Chelyabinsk re-
gion, and Rosneft – nearly all gas in the Sverdlovsk region.97 In 2012 the so-called 
independents provided nearly 100% of gas in the Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk 
Oblasts, as well as 73% in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug – Yugra, 72% 
96 Минэнерго отвергло идею ФАС о разделении «Газпрома», https://lenta.ru/news/ 2015 
/10 /15/gazprom_razdel/
97 T. Mitrova, Shifting Political Economy of Russian Oil and Gas, CSIS, March 2016, p. 21–22. 
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in the Perm Krai, 55% in the Novosibirsk Oblast, 52% in the Kemerovo Oblast 
and 46% in the Tomsk Oblast. 
In 2013, the government of the Russian Federation decided to freeze gas prices, 
which would henceforth only be adjusted for inflation. In September 2014, the 
Federal Tariffs Service submitted a draft regulation to the government, under 
which Gazprom would be given the right to offer discounts of up to 15%. Around 
30% of Gazprom’s gas is delivered to the municipal and public sectors, which 
generate the greatest arrears in gas payments.98 As an alternative, the Federal 
Anti-Monopoly Service proposed moving away from regulated prices to spot 
prices pegged to the prices in the St. Petersburg exchange.99 However, the trad-
ing mechanism has not been particularly effective so far. In 2015, 5 billion m3 of 
gas was traded in the exchange, i.e. seven times less than the maximum allowed 
ceiling (35 billion m3 of gas a year). 
It is very likely that, due to the price freeze, in 2016 Gazprom will report, for the 
first time since 2008, a loss on its gas sales on the internal market. As a long-
term consequence, that will erode interest in supplies to the domestic market 
and make the so-called independent gas producers even more interested in 
gaining access to the export channel.100 
Another	important	problem	concerns	the	tariff	policy.	Transmission tariffs 
for the so-called independents are still higher than those paid by Gazprom’s 
daughter companies (for whom Gazprom itself sets the tariffs). Nevertheless, 
those differences have been systematically narrowing down. Back in 2010, the 
difference was 28%, compared to a mere 8% in 2015.101 
98 Как поделить рынок газа?, Нефтегазовая Вертикаль, Issue 13–14, 2015, p. 76.
99 T. Mitrova, Shifting Political Economy of Russian Oil and Gas, op. cit., p. 23–24. 
100 Ibidem, p. 4–5. 
101 Как поделить рынок газа?, Нефтегазовая Вертикаль, Issue 13–14, 2015, p. 79.
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Table 10. Gas transmission tariffs for Gazprom and the so-called independent 
gas producers (Roubles per 1000 m3 per 100 km) 102
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gazprom 40.2 43 48.7 53.2 57.4 60.2
So-called independent gas producers102 51.4 56.2 58.1 61.7 63.9 65.2
Author’s own compilation based on figures published by Interfax. 
The price and tariff issues have given rise to a conflict between Gazprom and 
the so-called independent producers. The former demands the right to offer 
discounts under contracts concluded with industrial consumers and extended 
possibilities for selling gas in Russia via the St. Petersburg International Mer-
cantile Exchange (SPIMEX). The so-called independent gas producers, on the 
other hand, are not interested in Gazprom gaining the right to offer discounts 
to industrial consumers because they would lose their competitive advantage, 
thanks to which they have been able to substantially expand their share in Rus-
sia’s domestic gas market. Rosneft has been the most vocal opponent of the idea 
of allowing Gazprom to offer discounts to industrial customers. Representatives 
of the company have pointed out that they would be willing to change their 
position only if Gazprom agreed to buy gas from the so-called independent pro-
ducers at prices similar to its export rates (export rate minus transport costs). 
Statements by Gazprom representatives suggest that the company would only 
be willing to accept prices at the level of 70% of its export rates (to be reached 
gradually by 2025); as for the question of aligning internal and export prices, 
Gazprom argues that it should be postponed until after 2025. 
A compromise has also been difficult to reach on the issue of tariff setting. Ros-
neft argues that the tariffs on its gas should be decreased by 25–40% and sug-
gests that the prices of gas storage (presently set by Gazprom) should be set by 
a state authority. Gazprom is not prepared to reduce tariffs for the so-called 
independent producers, claiming that it bears very high costs in connection 
with the so-called guaranteed gas supplies to regions located very far from gas 
production centres and that those costs should be compensated for by those 
market players who face no such burdens. 
102 Средний уровень тарифов на услуги ОАО «Газпром» для независимых организаций 
по транспортировке газа по магистральным газопроводам, http://zhkh.fas.gov.ru/
tariffs/analit_info/gas/17 
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3. Fiscal changes
Over	the	last	15	years,	the	tax	regulations	applicable	to	the	gas	sector	have	
changed	only	partly.	
The fiscal mechanisms operating in the gas sector include export duties and the 
gas extraction tax (NDPI). The rate of export duty stands at 30% of the contrac-
tual price. Because the prices of Russian gas under export contracts during the 
years 2006–2010 increased by a factor of 1.4 and doubled in the domestic mar-
ket, the NDPI rate was raised several times, beginning from 2011. Moreover, as 
a result of the so-called independent producers’ lobbying efforts, since 2012 dif-
ferent NDPI rates apply to Gazprom and the other gas producers (see Table 11 for 
details). In 2014, an NDPI differentiation scheme was introduced, under which 
the rate depends on the location of the gas field and current internal and export 
prices of gas.103 
Table 11. NDPI rates for Gazprom and the other gas producers 
(roubles per 1000 m3) 104
2005 2006-2010 2011 2012 2013 (i-vi)
2013 
(vii-xii) 2014 2015 2016
Gazprom 135 147 237 509 582 622 700 788 888104
Others 135 147 237 251 265 402 471 552 552
Source: Нефтегазовая Вертикаль 
Fiscal changes in the gas sector are motivated primarily by the state’s current 
financial needs. In November 2015, at the government’s request, a bill was 
adopted which increased the NDPI rate for companies possessing the right to 
export gas (in practice, the increased rate applied only to Gazprom).105 
103 Налоги и отрасль: от косметики к ремонту, Нефтегазовая Вертикаль, Issue 23–24, 2014, 
p. 22. 
104 Ultimately Gazprom’s NDPI rate was RUB 1078 per 1000 m3 following the amendment of the 
tax regulations adopted in the autumn of 2016. 
105 The Russian State Duma adopted the bill in November 2015. 
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4. plans for a transformation of Gazprom and de-monopolisation 
of exports
Calls	for	a	restructuring	of	Gazprom	first surfaced in public debate in Rus-
sia in the early 2000s. The so-called Gref Plan proposed a general blueprint 
for breaking up Gazprom and creating separate gas production companies and 
transmission system operators.106 The draft reform plan for the gas sector speci-
fied that the so-called independent gas producers would get access to the gas 
pipeline system in the first phase of the reform.107
Since then, the idea that Gazprom should be split up has been regularly recur-
ring in industry debates in Russia, and has been discussed particularly inten-
sively during the last four years due to the insistence of Rosneft and Novatek.
In the summer of 2015 Rosneft and its CEO, Igor Sechin, presented the most 
comprehensive gas sector reform plan to date in a special letter to the Ministry 
of Energy of the Russian Federation. The planned reform would consist of three 
stages. The first one, in the years 2015–2018, would include setting separate tar-
iffs for the transmission of gas within the Russian Federation and for the export 
of gas. Rosneft also called for increasing the volume of gas sold via gas exchange 
and proposed allowing the so-called independent gas producers to launch gas 
supplies to foreign customers on a test basis, under agency agreements with 
Gazprom. The second stage of the reform in the years 2019–2022 would consist 
of creating an independent company from Gazprom’s assets to buy gas from the 
so-called independent producers to resell it in the European market, or, alter-
natively, introducing a system of quotas for the supply of gas to Europe. At the 
same time, prices in the internal market would be completely deregulated. 
The third stage, in the years 2023–2026, would consist of a full liberalisation 
of the gas market, including the creation of separate companies spun off from 
Gazprom for the transport and storage of gas in Russia. According to Rosneft’s 
calculations, the changes could lead to an increase in gas production of 50 bil-
lion m3 a year and increase the state budget’s revenues (from the NDPI, export 
duties and real estate taxes) by around RUB 350 billion a year108. 
106 A solution modelled on the oil sector where Transneft, a state-owned company completely 
independent and separate from companies producing and supplying oil to domestic and for-
eign markets, owns and operates the transmission infrastructure. 
107 K. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, op. cit., p. 9-11. 
108 Либерализация газового рынка: ломать не строить, Нефтегазовая Вертикаль, Issue 1–2, 
2016, p. 18. 
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The	proposals	to	break	up	Gazprom	are	closely	related	to	the	proposals	to	
limit	its	monopoly	on	gas	exports. A gradual de-monopolisation of Russia’s 
gas exports was formerly envisaged in the draft reform plan for the gas sector, 
presented in the Russian government’s meeting on 7 December 2000. The three-
stage reform plan stipulated that in the second stage the so-called independent 
producers would be allowed to export gas to CIS countries, while capping their 
maximum share at 25% of Russia’s total gas exports, and that in the third stage 
they would also be allowed to export gas to Europe. In 2006, however, Gazprom’s 
position was further consolidated by an amendment to the law on gas exports 
which granted the company a statutory monopoly on gas exports. 
Novatek and Rosneft, Gazprom’s largest rivals joined recently by LUKOIL, have 
also been systematically lobbying for a de-monopolisation of gas exports.109 The 
first step in that direction was taken in the autumn of 2013, when an amend-
ment to the law on gas exports enabled selected companies (in practice, only 
Novatek and Rosneft) to export liquefied gas.110 In 2014 lobbying efforts were 
stepped up to gain the right for the so-called independent producers to export 
gas via the pipeline system. The demand was presented openly in June 2014 by 
Igor Sechin during a meeting of the Presidential Commission for the fuel and 
energy sector. He proposed a pilot project to export gas to China via the Power 
of Siberia pipeline. In August 2014 Gennady Timchenko, one of the owners of 
Novatek, suggested that in return for the ability to export gas via the gas pipe-
line system, the so-called independent gas producers should participate in the 
costs of new transmission infrastructure development.111 The Rosneft CEO again 
raised the topic of de-monopolising pipeline exports in December 2016 in a spe-
cial letter to president Vladimir Putin.112 
Those proposals were opposed not only by Gazprom, but also the Russian Min-
istry of Energy, which stands by the position that Gazprom should keep its 
109 «Лукойл» просит задуматься о либерализации рынка газа, http://www.vedomosti.ru/
business/articles/2017/02/08/676598-lukoil-liberalizatsii-gaza 
110 For more information on the new regulations and their impact, see: Sz. Kardaś, A feigned 
liberalisation: Russia is restricting Gazprom’s monopoly on exports, OSW Commentary, 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2013-11-28/a-feigned-liberali-
sation-russia-restricting-gazproms-monopoly 
111 Тимченко: Независимые производители должны финансировать "Силу Сибири" 
в случае допуска к экспорту газа, http://1prime.ru/INDUSTRY/20140803/789423525.html 
112 Сечин обещал 500 млрд руб. налогов за отмену монополии «Газпрома», http://www.
rbc.ru/business/24/01/2017/588731199a7947c2b1eee434 
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monopoly on pipeline exports (both to Europe and, in future, to China) at least 
until 2025.113
Over the last 15 years, the various plans to structurally transform Gazprom 
have failed to materialise. On top of this, the state has systematically tightened 
its control of the company and this process is unlikely to abate in the com-
ing years. The state still holds a controlling stake in Gazprom and president 
Vladimir Putin directly participates in the gas monopoly’s foreign activities 
and personally decides on all issue of strategic importance for the company and 
the entire sector. 
While	the	so-called	independent	producers	have	been	stepping	up	their	lob-
bying	efforts	to	further	restrain	Gazprom’s	position,114	any	serious	systemic	
change	is	unlikely	to	happen	in	the	next	4	to	5	years	due	to	several	factors. 
First of all, the Russian leadership is likely to postpone political decisions on the 
matter because of Russia’s worsening economic problems, related partly to the 
unfavourable situation in external energy markets. Due to the sharp decline in 
oil prices, as a result of which Russia’s budget revenue has shrunk considerably, 
as well as the growing competition that Russian energy companies are facing 
from other exporters, the Russian government’s priority is focused on efforts to 
maintain Russia’s position in strategic markets. The Russian leadership believes 
that any serious systemic reform (such as a division of Gazprom) would not be 
guaranteed to increase the chances of success of those efforts. Moreover, the 
main lobbying forces are slightly less powerful now. Rosneft is struggling with 
its own serious financial problems, as a result of which Igor Sechin has been 
unable to persuade Vladimir Putin to back systemic change in the gas sector, 
despite his traditionally close ties with the Russian president. While president 
Putin did order the government to draft proposals for a reform of the tariff sys-
tem and mechanisms to ensure equal access to infrastructure during a meeting 
of the Presidential Commission on the fuel and energy sector in October 2015, 
no such proposals have been presented to date, despite strict deadlines.115 
113 Газовый рынок в тумане. В отрасли не могут согласовать концепцию развития, http://
kommersant.ru/doc/3030949
114 For instance, in the meetings of the Presidential Commission for the fuels and energy sec-
tor in June 2014 and October 2015, during which questions over the gas sector’s reform were 
raised, including the so-called independent producers’ access to pipeline exports, harmo-
nisation of transmission tariffs in the internal market or equal access to internal infra-
structure. 
115 Putin had issued similar orders when he was prime minister in 2009. 
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Secondly, no fundamental change has occurred in the approach of the key deci-
sion-making groups; the Russian leadership is still more interested in extract-
ing financial gains from the sector, as it was in the early 2000s, than it is in the 
sector’s genuine modernisation and restructuring.116 In any case, even though 
Gazprom is now much less effective as a foreign policy tool than it was in recent 
years, it nevertheless still plays an important role in the state’s internal policy. 
It serves to subsidise unprofitable companies and deficit regions, and to support 
infrastructure projects of strategic importance for the Kremlin. 
Finally, any systemic change would require the so-called independent gas pro-
ducers to assume, in return for the curbing of Gazprom’s privileges, various 
social obligations, the burden of which currently rests on Russia’s biggest gas 
company. For instance, they would have to take over some of the less profitable 
or completely unprofitable supply markets currently served by Gazprom or par-
ticipate in the financing of the extension and modernisation of transmission 
infrastructure.
***
The Russian gas sector has found itself in a difficult situation. The mounting 
challenges and problems are primarily the consequence of the sector’s politici-
sation and the absence of reforms, which have been repeatedly postponed. Be-
cause Gazprom serves as an internal and foreign policy instrument and a source 
of revenues for the Russian elite, economic calculations or the interests of the 
sector as a whole have often been ignored. This has led to problems in the gas 
production sector and challenges in external markets. 
An analysis of the history of state strategic documents for the gas sector in 
hindsight reveals much wishful thinking and a deep inadequacy of the assess-
ment of risks in the dynamically changing global energy markets. Because of 
these shortcomings, the successive strategic documents have not played any 
significant role. The limited de-monopolisation that has been progressing in 
Russia’s internal market is not part of a long-awaited and postulated genuine 
liberalisation process. That is because the actors involved are companies which 
have very close ties with the ruling elite (Rosneft, Novatek) and are guided 
not so much by the interests of the sector as the desire to gain as much as they 
can from the redistribution of proceeds generated by the gas sector, in which 
116 K. Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, op. cit., p. 9–11.
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the state still plays a dominant role via Gazprom. Genuine liberalisation would 
be a positive thing but given the current unfavourable price situation and the 
problems faced by the entire Russian economy, one should not expect radical 
systemic change to take place in the sector in the coming years. 
SzYMON	KARDAś	
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appEndix ii. russian gas exports via pipelines (billions m3)
central Bank figures Gazprom figures 120
so-called 
distant 
abroad 121
post-
soviet 
states
total Europe
post-soviet states 
(including the Baltic 
states)
total
2000 134 59.9 193.9 129 43.4 172.4
2001 131.9 48.9 180.98 126.9 39.6 166.5
2002 134.2 51.3 185.5 128.6 42.3 170.9
2003 142 47.3 189.4 132.9 42.6 175.5
2004 145.3 55.1 200.4 140.5 122 52.5 123 193
2005 161.7 47.5 209.2 156.1 76.6 232.7
2006 161.8 41 202.8 161.5 101 262.5
2007 154.4 37.5 191.9 168.5 100.9 269.4
2008 158.4 37 195.4 184.4 124 96.5 280.9
2009 120.5 47.9 168.4 152.8 125 67.7 220.5
2010 107.4 70.4 177.8 148.1 70.2 218.3
2011 117.2 72.5 189.7 156.6 81.7 238.3
2012 112.7 66 178.7 151 66.1 217.1
2013 138 58.4 196.4 174.3 59.4 233.7
2014 126.2 48 174.3 159.4 48.1 207.5
2015 144.7 40.7 185.5 184.4 40.3 224.7
2016 164.7 34 198.7 179.3 31.5 210.8
Author’s own compilation based on figures published by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, 
Gazprom and the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation. 
120 Figures based on annual reports published by Gazprom in 2000–2016. Gazprom’s data in-
cludes gas produced in Russia as well as gas purchased by the Russian company from Cen-
tral Asian states and Azerbaijan and the re-exported to foreign consumers. 
121 In Russia, this notion refers to all European customers (both EU members and non-EU 
countries) except for the Baltic States, as well as Turkey. 
122 The 2005 Report stated than in 2004 Gazprom supplied 153.2 billion m3 of gas to European 
states. 
123 The 2005 Report stated that in 2004 Gazprom supplied 65.7 billion m3 of gas to the CIS 
states. 
124 The 2009 Report stated that in 2008 Gazprom supplied 167.6 billion m3 of gas to European 
states. 
125 The 2010 Report stated that in 2009 Gazprom supplied 148.3 billion m3 of gas to European 
states. 
